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The Next Frontier in Public School Finance Reform:
A Policy and Constitutional Analysis of
School Choice Legislation
ChristopherD. Pixley*

I. INTRODUCTION
As long as local school systems can be assured of state aid and increasing federal
aid without the accountability which inevitably comes with aggressive competition,
it would be sentimental, wishful thinking to expect any significant increase in the
efficiency of our public schools. If there are no alternatives to the present system ...then the possibilities of improvement in public education are limited.'
Although debate over the quality of public schools has raged since the dawn of compulsory education in the United States, the call for widespread remedial action has only
recently occupied the public's attention.2 In particular, the past quarter-century has

* Dennis, Corry & Porter, Atlanta, Georgia. J.D. Vanderbilt University School of Law. Special
thanks to Alex Hurder, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, for his review of drafts of this article.
A strong supporter of the public education system, Professor Hurder's thoughtful analysis and wellreasoned inquiry shed light on the range of issues facing any system of compulsory education.
1. Kenneth B. Clark, Alternative Public School Systems, 38 HARv. EDuc. REV. 100, 111 (1968);
see also Robert Lutz & Clark Durant, The Key to Better Schools, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1996, at
A14 ("Public schools too often fail because they are shielded from the very force that improves performance and sparks innovation in nearly every other human enterprise-competition.").
2. See DAVID C. BERLINER & BRUCE J. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS: MYTHS, FRAUD,
AND THE ATTACK ON AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1995) (citing income inequality, urban decay,
violence, drugs, an aging population and competing demands for funds as obstacles which education
reformers are content to ignore); JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990) (analyzing a comprehensive database on American schools and concluding
that private schools achieve superior outcomes as a result of greater school and teacher autonomy);
PETER

W.

COOKSON,

SCHOOL CHOICE:

THE

STRUGGLE

FOR

THE SOUL OF AMERICAN

EDUCATION

(1994) (finding several potential disadvantages to school choice programs, including the long term
impact of unequal access to schools); CHESTER E. FINN, JR., WE MUST TAKE CHARGE: OUR SCHOOLS
AND OUR FUTURE (1991) (suggesting detailed criteria for the development of institutional accountability
among public schools); Louis GERSTNER, REINVENTING EDUCATION (1994) (recommending greater
teacher autonomy and the creation of competitive markets for educational services); ROBERT
HAGGERTY, THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR FIXING WHAT
Is WRONG & RESTORING AMERICA'S CONFIDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1995) (pointing to vio-

lence, instability of the American family unit, and the decline of business and institutional ethics as
influences upon, rather than results of, the American system of public education); DAVID HARMER,
SCHOOL CHOICE: WHY YOU NEED IT, How YOU GET IT (1994) (describing the cost inefficiencies in
the public school structure and the benefits of adopting a universal voucher system); MYRON
LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC EDUCATION: AN AUTOPSY (1993) (calling for the inclusion of for-profit schools in
any market-based reform program, and explaining the limits of monopolies and the expansion of irrelevant educational offerings); NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A
NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM, A REPORT TO THE NATION AND THE
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION (1983) [hereinafter A NATION AT RISK] (findings of a presidentially-appointed council that the educational skills of the current generation will not surpass, nor even approach
those of their parents, leading to a concurrent decline in economic prosperity); JAMES R. RINEHART &
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seen an assault against funding disparities between individual school districts in a
given state.3 Such disparities arise because local school districts are required by state
laws to raise nearly half the money necessary for operation through local property
taxes. 4 Since "property-rich"5 districts generate more money for education than school
districts in "property-poor" districts, students in the most impoverished areas attend
the most poorly funded schools.7

JACKSON F. LEE, JR., AMERICAN EDUCATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF CHOICE (1991)

(noting that any
meaningful gain in educational standards is impossible under the present system of public education
and suggesting deregulation and privatization as structurally viable methods of reform); SANDRA A.
WADDOCK, NOT BY SCHOOLS ALONE: SHARING RESPONSIBIUTY FOR AMERICA'S EDUCATION REFORM

(1995) (discussing the role of family, community and technology in the reform of American public
education); KENNETH G. WILSON & BENNE'rr DAvIss, REDESIGNING EDUCATION (1994) (calling for
systems management, greater teacher autonomy, application of cognitive learning models, cooperative as
opposed to competitive learning and the use of computer-based learning technologies in the classroom);
Lamar Alexander, What We Were Doing When We Were Interrupted, in NATIONAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION: THE PAST Is PROLOGUE 73 (John F. Jennings ed., 1993) (arguing for sweeping changes to the
educational system he oversaw as Secretary of Education for the Bush administration); William J.
Bennett, An Obligation to Educate, CAL. POL. REV., Summer 1992, at 20 (concluding from his experiences as Secretary of Education for the Reagan Administration that market-based reform is necessary);
Edward M. Kennedy, The Nation Is at Even Greater Risk Now, in NATIONAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION:
THE PAST Is PROLOGUE 19 (John F. Jennings ed., 1993) (suggesting an expansion of programs such
as Head Start and increased training and professionalism among our educators).
3. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Mclnnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nor., Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969);
Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1971); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd mem., 397 U.S. 44
(1970); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of
Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v.
State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (11. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
Hombeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v. Green, 203
N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (NJ.) cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S.
1139 (1983); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987);
Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Danson v. Casey, 399
A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71
(Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568
(Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980). This list excludes federal decisions because the most prominent avenues of federal remedial actions were denied in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4. A breakdown of the sources of public school funding shows variation from state to state.
Compare Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) (explaining in round
numbers that the state provides forty-two percent of educational funding, local school districts provide
fifty percent, and the remainder "comes from various other sources including federal funds") with
DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983) (stating that "the funding for
Arkansas schools comes from three sources: state revenues provide 51.6%, local revenues 38.1%, and
federal revenues 10.3%").
5. The term "property-rich" districts as used in this article refers to districts with a high property
tax base per pupil relative to other communities throughout the state. The author nonetheless acknowledges the existence of districts whose high tax revenues are offset by unusually high municipal and
educational expenses.
6. The term "property-poor" districts refers to districts with a relatively low tax base per pupil.
7. See Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform
Cases: Myth or Methodology, 45 VAND. L. REv. 129, 132 (1991). A variation in property values
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Despite attempts of state legislatures to correct school finance disparities through
various equalization plans,' the frequent failure of these plans to achieve their stated
purpose has resulted in citizens across the country instituting lawsuits to achieve true
equality of educational funding." Although a large number of these suits have fallen
short of achieving a judicial mandate of educational equality, public discontent has
nonetheless centered upon successful finance reform litigation. This discontent is related to the inability of lawmakers to fashion legislation in conformity with court orders." Increasingly, lawmakers, educators, and the courts are acknowledging both the
structural impediments to true equality," as well as the tendency of the governmental
branches to avoid responsibility for crafting solutions. 2

between districts leads both to disparities in available funding as well as disparities in the available tax
burden levied upon district residents. Id. Poorer districts are often forced to tax at a higher rate than
wealthier districts merely to collect a fraction of the per pupil funding which the wealthier districts
receive. This point is highlighted by the Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989):
Property-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which there is no opportunity to free themselves. Because of their inadequate tax base, they must tax at significandy higher tax rates in order to meet minimum requirements for accreditation; yet their
educational programs are typically inferior. The location of new industry and development is strongly influenced by tax rates and the quality of local schools. Thus, the property-poor districts with their high tax rates and inferior schools are unable to attract new
industry or development and so have little opportunity to improve their tax base.
Id. at 393.
8. States have enacted various equalization plans to correct funding disparities between districts.
The most frequently employed methods are Flat Grants, Foundation Plans and Funding Equalization
Plans. Under a system of Flat Grants, an absolute amount of state money is paid to each district on a
per pupil or per teacher basis. Flat Grants are a state-wide aid program which provides funds to
wealthy and poor districts alike. As a consequence, although Flat Grants act as an aid to poor districts
struggling to meet necessary operating expenses, they do not eliminate funding disparities between the
property-rich and property-poor districts which receive them in equal measure.
In contrast, Foundation Plans affect only needy districts. These state-aid programs amount to a
guarantee that a state will provide funds to any district which is unable to meet a specified minimum
level of financing through local property -taxes. While Foundation Plans provide aid exclusively to
property-poor districts, they only provide funds to achieve a specified minimum level of operating
expenditure. For this reason, they fail to equalize disparities in available funds between districts.
Finally, several states have enacted Funding Equalization Plans. Here, the state guarantees that
any district which will tax itself at a specified minimum rate will receive the same amount of money
per pupil as all districts which tax themselves at that rate. Thus, in theory, a poor district which taxes
at the same rate as a wealthy district will receive the same funding per pupil as the wealthy district
by way of a state subsidy to local property tax revenues. Unfortunately, the level of funding a state
may offer to achieve equalization by way of this plan is generally capped by state budgets.
Although many states apply one or a combination of these programs, they have not achieved
their stated purpose. See generally WALTER I. GARMs ET AL., SCHOOL FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS AND
PoLmcs OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (1978) (discussing the failure of equalization strategies).
9. See cases cited supra note 3.
10. See generally Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104
HARV. L. REv. 1072 (1991) (arguing for greater judicial activism in the area of finance reform following years of legislative inaction on judicial reform mandates).
11. The impediments referred to here are those resulting from cost differentials for everything
from accommodations for students with special needs (frequently higher in urban districts) to the cost
of school construction, security and teachers' salaries (invariably higher in urban districts). These issues
are treated at length in Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain, On the Value of Equality of Educational
Opportunity as a Guide to Public Policy, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNrrY 116
(Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972).
12. Attempts to avoid responsibility for implementing the difficult decisions associated with finance reform efforts were starkly demonstrated by the New Jersey legislative, judicial and executive
branches in the series of decisions in Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J.
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In response to the relatively bleak prospects for existing finance reform measures, the battle lines over the improvement of public education have shifted. Although
the focus of finance reform litigation has traditionally centered on the portion of school
district revenues generated by local property taxes, the level of such revenues is most
critical in a system where students are required to attend a designated school in their
district. With the advent of state educational choice efforts, district boundaries are
being removed. 3 Moreover, in the case of privatization legislation, parents who previously could not afford to choose where their child matriculated would have personal
access to a per pupil share of the state's education budget, one of the major sources of
funding for the operation of public schools.' 4 The new frontier in public school finance reform is shifting the focus of reform efforts from the redistribution of taxpayer
wealth to an emphasis on the overall competitiveness of our public schools.
This article advocates the infusion of competition into the public school arena
and surveys the various policy and constitutional challenges to privatization. Part H
examines the growing need for reform of the public educational system as illustrated
by the declining performance of American public school students. Part II also examines funding as a determinant of educational achievement and explores how the growth
of the education bureaucracy over the past thirty years has shifted public education
resources away from classrooms. Part II concludes with an examination of the challenges and opportunities which privatization efforts will face. Part III surveys the state
and federal constitutional challenges to school choice legislation. The article concludes
with a discussion of why well-crafted legislation offering school choice should withstand constitutional scrutiny.

1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193, reprinted in corrected form, 351 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975);
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (NJ. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (NJ. 1976). Robinson was taken to the state supreme court seven times
over issues relating to implementation of the remedy ordered by the court.
13. States have enacted various school choice programs in an attempt to create a free market of
educational alternatives. The four types of choice programs in use offer a range of alternatives to
students attending a designated public school in their district. Intra-district Public Choice frees parents
to choose among public schools in their district. Inter-district Public Choice expands this alternative by
offering parents the option of aunsferring their children into school districts other than their own. Both
of these systems condition the acceptance of students on the availability of space in the chosen school.
The third approach adopted by a number of states is Market-Oriented Public Choice. This method of
school choice focuses on the creation of self-managed public schools funded according to the level of
enrollment but free of many of the state's educational regulations. The final method applied today is
Private Choice, a system which provides funds directly to parents in the form of vouchers or tax
breaks which fund all or a portion of the cost of the public or private school chosen. The latter two
methods of choice are the main focus of this article.
14. Funding for public schools is derived from three major sources: state tax revenues, local
school district property tax revenues, and the federal government monies earmarked for education. Of
these sources, state tax revenues and local property taxes account for more than ninety percent of the
funding for a majority of school districts. It is precisely because local property taxes constitute such a
large portion of public school revenues (with property taxes often accounting for more than fifty percent of the district's funding) that disparities between school districts are frequently significant. See,
e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark. 1983) (noting a nearly three to one
disparity in the actual per pupil funding of Arkansas school districts); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. I
v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 686 (Mont. 1989) (finding spending disparities as high as eight to one between similarly sized school districts); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, .392
(Tex. 1989) (finding that the wealthiest district in the state had over $14 million in property-wealth
per student, while the poorest district had approximately $20,000-a 700 to one differential).
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H. THE GROWING NEED FOR REFORM OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
SYSTEM
The politics of the United States as of other countries is influenced, and influenced
for the worse, by the fact that the use of markets are imperfectly understood by a
majority of the citizens. No doubt this popular misunderstanding of economics does
on occasion lead to the gratuitous or even harmful use of government to perform
certain social functions for which the government does not have a comparative
advantage. Though there are some valid arguments that point in the opposite direction, it is surely a reasonable hypothesis that the limited understanding of economics among
the laity leads to a somewhat bigger public sector than would be
5
optimal.

A. What Is School Choice?
America's current public school system represents a virtual monopoly. 6 Although private institutions resemble market competitors, no true market exists because
public and private institutions are non-profit entities. As non-profit entities, they do not
react to losses in market share the way a company selling a service for profit would.
In a free market, competitors must monitor the innovations of other companies and the
demands and preferences of consumers. Cost and the quality of service are factors, as
is the availability of efficiencies in service and new product offerings. In contrast to
the free market approach, education consumers rarely choose between public and private schools by reference to which system is most efficient or offers the latest innovations in educational techniques. Instead, general concepts of the effectiveness of public
and private schools, in addition to the wherewithal of parents, dictate the choice between forums. 7 Without the pressure to react to market share, non-profit
schools-both public and private-lack the incentives to keep pace with the changing
needs of the free market their graduates will enter. Moreover, because public and private schools cannot retain excess tuition as profits they lack the incentives to lower
costs while increasing student achievement."8 The inclusion of for-profit schools is,
therefore, essential to the creation of true competition. Choice plans which exclude forprofit schools from participation fail to create a competitive market system. Proposals
such as the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, which illustrate this deficiency, are
herein discussed.
The most promising school choice initiatives operate on the premise that nothing
short of a free market for schools will create the proper incentives for improvements in
education. 9 Proponents of school choice believe the availability of for-profit schools

15.

Mancur Olson, Comment, in CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 89 (Richard B. McKenzie ed.,

1984).
16. HARMER, supra note 2, at 55-57.
17. See Sheila N. Kirby & Linda Darling-Hammond, Parental Schooling Choice: A Case Study of
Minnesota, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSiS & MGMT. 506 (1988) (positing that the choice of private education
has a direct relationship to family income and general perceptions regarding the quality of public and
private instruction).
18. See generally Calvin A. Kent, Privatization of Public Functions: Promises and Problems, in
ENTREPRENEURsIP AND THE PRIVAT ZNG OF GOvERNMENT 18 (Calvin A. Kent ed., 1987) (emphasizing the necessity for proper competitive incentives in order to reduce the cost of administering education).
19. Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit Corporations in Revitalizing Public Education: A
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will infuse competition into primary and secondary education, thereby fostering improvement. In practice, school choice would entail the distribution of a tax "voucher"
to parents which would be redeemable as tuition dollars for a student's enrollment in
the public, private or for-profit school of the parents' choice.2 ° Unlike the present system, in a competitive environment the cost of education should not be a barrier to a
student's attendance at the best regional school. In the absence of a true competitive
system with for-profit participants, the effect of tuition vouchers could be negated by
private schools increasing their tuition costs by the amount of the universally distributed voucher. Those wealthy enough to send their children to a private school would
continue to do so, and the rest would be left to choose among various public school
choices. By contrast, although any competitive voucher system will require parents to
absorb the expense of tuition costs exceeding the value of the tax voucher, the inclusion of for-profit schools within the sysm will promote cost competition and efficien cies which have been lacking in our non-profit system. Ultimately, if the financial
viability of every school depends on its cost efficiency and the achievement of its
students, our educational system should become more affordable and more effective.
B. Why School Choice?

-

What Is Wrong With the Current System?

Since the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983,21 the movement for educational reform has been heard throughout both the public and private sector, by authors,
legislators, economists, businessmen, and notably by two former Secretaries of Education.22 Authored by the National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation

Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 883, 930 (1993) ("Policy makers must wrestle with
the need to encourage public schools to have a stake in a higher level of efficiency and accountability
and to develop a system that seeks improvement. This transformation of the public school system must
occur within the context of achieving a public sector that is less bureaucratic and more entrepreneurial."). See also James A. Peyser, Issues in Education Law and Policy: School Choice: When, Not If,
35 B.C. L. REv. 619, 629 (discussing the necessity for free market entrants in a choice system).
One of the difficulties in discussing educational "choice" results from the various conceptions of
the term. While one commentator may view "choice" as a concept involving universal access to a
variety of education providers, others assign the term to any program which offers alternatives to enrollment in a district school, even if the alternatives are limited to a small group of students. Professor
Sharon Keller's article in this volume of the Journal of Legislation examines the latter concept of
"choice." In her article, Professor Keller reviews a program aimed at a group of African-American parents in Detroit seeking the establishment of charter Afrocentric male academies offering "educational
programs that . . . focus on the special problems of an identified population of students." Sharon
Keller, Something to Lose: The Black Community's Hard Choices About Educational Choice, 24 J.
LEGIs. 67, 67 n.2 (1998) (quoting Detroit Public Schools, Male Academy Grades K-8: A Demonstration Program for At-Risk Males 8 (Dec. 7, 1990) (draft on file with Professor Sharon Keller, University of Miami School of Law)). The program is deemed "Alternative Schools of Choice." Keller, supra,
at 67. Because the "alternative" schools scrutinized by Professor Keller offer choice to a small, segregated class of students, they fail to represent the type of universal "choice" analyzed in this article.
Unfortunately, references to limited access programs-such as Detroit's Afrocentric male
academies-as "school choice" have a tendency to handicap public discussions of universal choice
legislation by conjuring images of schools which limit access according to race, wealth, religious affiliation or scores on private entrance examinations. It is precisely these images which tend to undermine
universal choice legislation by generating the unfounded fear among parents that their child may be
relegated to a substandard school because of discriminatory admissions criteria.
20. E.G. West, The Prospects for Education Vouchers: An Economic Analysis, in TtE PUBLIC
SCHOOL MONOPOLY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION AND THE STATE IN AMERICA 368, 369-79
(Robert B. Everhart ed., 1982).
21. A NATION AT RISK, supra note 2.
22. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 2; GERSTNER, supra note 2; HARMER, supra note 2;
LIEBERMAN, supra note 2; RINEHART & LEE, JR., supra note 2; WILSON & DAVISS,

supra note 2;
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at Risk noted that "the educational foundations of our society are being threatened by a
rising tide of mediocrity.""3 The risk identified by the authors included low perfor-

mance of American students on international comparisons of student achievement, a
finding that twenty-three million American adults were functionally illiterate, evidence

that functional illiteracy among minority youth was as high as forty percent and statistics demonstrating that average achievement of high school seniors on standardized
tests was lower than in 1957, when Sputnik was launched.24 The Commission's members cited failures in the content of educational offerings and the quality of instruction,
and concluded that the decline in educational performance results largely from the way
education in the United States is conducted.' Today the debate over the need for
school reform continues to escalate, with statistics and studies being rapidly generated,
cited, reexamined and disputed. Although debate is often limited to whether our educational system is failing, it has become clear that America is no longer a leader in
educational achievement. Following more than a decade of marginal progress toward
the improvement of our public schools, today's reformers are examining whether government is the most effective service provider available.
1. Declining Performance of American Students
a. The Purpose of Educational Comparisons
Many of the leading opponents of school choice argue that a major cause for
concern about American schools is the perceived loss of economic competitiveness in
international markets.26 According to Jeffrey Henig,

Alexander, supra note 2; Bennett, supra note 2; Kennedy, supra note 2. But see ARTHUR J. NEWMAN,
IN DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL (1978) (illustrating two centuries of criticism and reform movements aimed at redefining our nation's educational goals and the method of delivering education); DAvID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TLNKERING TOWARD UTOPIA (1995) (arguing that a century
of so-called school reforms has illustrated a great disparity between reform goals and the effect of implemented reforms).
23. A NATION AT RISK, supra note 2, at 5. The Commission itself was appointed by the Secretary of Education, T.H. Bell. Members were selected according to the criteria set forth in the
Commission's charter, which sought representatives with knowledge of educational programs at various
levels and familiar with the views of the public, employers, educators and leaders in a range of professions. Id. at 40. Among the members chosen were four university and college presidents, two university professors, two high school principals, a former State Commissioner of Education, a former
State Board of Education member, a former State Governor, a City School Board President, a Superintendent of Schools, a retired chairman of a multinational corporation, a founder of a small business,
the Immediate Past-President of the Foundation for Teaching Economics, the Immediate Past-President
of the National School Boards Association, and the National High School Teacher of the Year for
1981-82. Id. at iv. The Commission's report was the most prominent of a long series of officially
commissioned studies on the government school system, the majority of which had been "scathingly
critical." CHUBB & MOE, supra note 2, at 9-10; see also MAURICE R. BERUBE, TEACHER POLITICS:
THE INFLUENCE OF UNIONS 134-41 (1988) (offering an explanation of the Commission's findings and
a critical evaluation of the recommendations for reform).
24. A NATION AT RISK, supra note 2, at 8.
25. Id. at 18-23. The Commission's report represented more than a mere critique of American
education. A Nation at Risk offered a detailed list of recommendations regarding changes in content,
standards and expectations, time, teaching, leadership and fiscal support. Id. at 24-33. Specific recommendations included the increased use of standardized tests of achievement "not to be confused with
aptitude tests" and "career ladders for teachers" which would include "professionally competitive, market sensitive, and performance-based" salaries. Id. at 28-31.
26. THOMAS TOCH, IN THE NAME OF EXCELLENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE NATION'S
SCHOOLS, WHY IT'S FAILING, & WHAT SHOULD

BE DONE 17 (1991);

see also TYACK & CUBAN,

supra note 22, at 140 ("In the last generation, discourse about public schooling has become radically
narrowed. It has focused on international economic competition, test scores, and individual 'choice' of
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The argument is based on a simple causal chain: poor education leads to less
knowledge and innovation, less knowledge and innovation leads to faltering economic productivity, and faltering economic productivity leads directly to a decline
in the quality of life. And this message is sharpened with direct references to the
current and growing economic threat posed by Germany, Korea and Japan.27
Opponents of school choice argue that this theory misperceives the development of the
world economy. Economist Lester Thurow explains that until recently, the world economy was capital intensive, favoring resource abundant nations such as the United
States.'8 Today, with advances in technology and the shift to an information economy,
worldwide capital markets have developed which erase the advantage of resource
abundance.29 Henig concludes,
Even if the United States had maintained an educational edge over other nations ... it is likely that its economic competitive advantage would have narrowed
due to other forces. To acknowledge this is not to say that education is unimportant; to the contrary, a strong case can be made that changing world conditions
make national differences in education more important. But suggesting that changing conditions impose new educational demands has quite different implications
3
from suggesting that deteriorating education accounts for our current woes. 0
Henig and Thurow's observations accurately note that the redistribution of
trained personnel throughout the globe did not occur overnight. They suggest that the
evolution of international markets, not the educational achievement of America's work
force, has driven our loss of competitiveness. Henig goes so far as to suggest that there
is no evidence of overall decline in educational performance, that the rate of decline in
standardized test performance has decelerated and that claims of an educational crisis
in America ignore
improvements the nation has made in key areas such as narrowing
3'
the "racial gap. 1
Opponents of school choice initiatives have suggested that the risks associated
with reform are not justified by the data on educational performance. Although both
within-country comparisons of educational outcomes for American public and private
schools and between-country comparisons of national educational achievement among
industrialized countries consistently demonstrate poor performance by American public
schools, opponents of reform eschew the data, suggesting that the risks of large scale

schools."); Gerald W. Bracey, The Fifth Bracey Report on the Condition of Public Education, 77 PHi
DELTA KAPPAN 149, 157 (1995) (noting that the "trouble American automobile and parts makers [are]
having in Japan [has nothing to do with] schools' churning out doltish workers," and referring to the
"myth" that "in a competitive world, the quality of the education America's youngsters receive is the
prime determinant of the nation's future well-being.").
27. JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHoicE: LIMITS OF THE MARKEr METAPHOR 47
(1993).
28. Lester Thurow, The Centennial Essay, 178 AM. SH. BD. J. 41, 41-43 (1991).
29. Id. at 43.
30. HENIG, supra note 27, at 49 (citations omitted). Similarly, Tyack and Cuban view the emphasis on international competitiveness as a historical phenomenon arising out of extreme political conservatism. TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22, at 44 ("In the politically conservative 1890s, 1950s, and
1980s, policy talk about schooling stressed a struggle for national survival in international competition-with the Germans (1890s), Soviets (1950s) and Japanese (1980s) . . . while liberal eras such as
the 1930s and 1960s stressed an ideology of access and equality.").
31. HENIG, supra note 27, at 43. The reference to the "racial gap" denotes extreme disparities in
educational attainment along race lines.
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reform outweigh any possible benefits.32 Henig argues that if reform is at all necessary, America should employ the moderate combination of "proven techniques, calculated experimentation, monitoring of response, and readjustment based on feedback.""a He further cautions that applying the label "crisis" to current public school
problems creates a sense of urgency which could promote one-shot cures.34 Opponents also argue that reforms such as school choice will change the way school decisions are made, thereby making the process of education less democratic without any
guarantee that the substance of education will be improved.35
One drawback of these claims is that they are non-quantifiable. Because reform
opponents believe that Americans are overly dependent on standardized examinations
as a measure of performance,36 they refocus the public school debate toward issues
with less exacting standards. At present, student performance in core curriculum is the
only quantifiable measure of school success. Over time, the development of proficiency in math, science and writing have also gained increasing importance to employers,
most of whom have experienced sweeping technological change in recent years. As
Joseph Murphy has noted, even factory employees with relatively "low-tech" jobs are
failing to enter the workforce with a requisite mastery of math and reading.37 According to Murphy, "U.S. corporations spend $25 billion a year teaching employees skills
they should have learned at school. Motorola spends $50 million a year teaching seventh-grade math and English to 12,500 factory workers-half its hourly employees.
Kodak is teaching 2,500 how to read and write."3 This finding is further informed by

32. HARMER, supra note 2, at 15-17; see also AMERICAN Ass'N OF SCH. ADMN'RS, AMERICA
2000: WHERE SCHOOL LEADERS STAND 13 (1991) ("A scoreboard mentality has developed that undermines efforts aimed at enhancing student achievement. Any testing program must recognize the needs
of students to do their own personal best and achieve their personal goals, not just enhance comparisons with other schools, school districts, groups, states, or nations.").
33. HENIG, supra note 27, at 51. See generally SEYMOUR B. SARASON, THE PREDICTABLE FAILURE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM 117-34 (1990); TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22.
34. HENIG, supra note 27, at 51.
35. Id.; see also TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22.
36. TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22, at 62. Tyack and Cuban suggest, "A problem with defining
'success' as meeting predetermined goals . . . is that some of the most significant dimensions of actual programs, both positive and negative, may not be captured by the measured outcomes." Id. The
authors illustrate this conclusion by noting for example, that "minimum competency testing" resulted in
classroom instruction aimed at the development of basic skills needed to pass the competency exam
rather than "complex thinking skills." Id. Yet testing and the opportunity it provides for the comparison of alternative curricula is intended to identify and measure the development of higher level thinking. Our nation's most competitive and successful post-secondary institutions rely heavily upon standardized test results when assessing candidates for admission. It would seem reasonable, then, to rely
on such tests when determining the general success of different curricula and different institutions.
37. JOSEPH MURPHY, The Educational Reform Movement of the 1980s: A Comprehensive Analysis,
in THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1980s 3 (1990); see also THE HARRIS EDUC. RESEARCH CTR. AND THE COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AN ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE
VIEW OF EMPLOYERS, HIGHER EDUCATORS, THE PUBLIC, RECENT STUDENTS, AND THEIR PARENTS 8-12

(1992) (noting that twenty-eight percent of the 402 executives from small, medium and large companies participating in the study have been forced to create or increase "remedial and training services in
basic areas such as math, reading and writing" since 1987, and that sixty-nine percent report that for
every one acceptable high school graduate applicant, they must reject five others).
38. MURPHY, supra note 37, at 15; see also Bernard Avishai, Companies Can't Make Up for
Failing Schools, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1996, at A12. Avishai notes,
Over the past five years Motorola has spent some $30 million to support public school
reform. That's an admirable commitment, but one that underlines how futile it is to
speak of improving basic education through "corporate responsibility." Even if every
company in the Fortune 1000 spent twice as much as Motorola does on the schools, this
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a 1993 report of the United States Department of Education noting that many large
employers, including Bell Laboratories, Texas Instruments and IBM, are being forced
to fill research jobs with people educated outside the United States. Ultimately, even
if American economic prosperity could be said to be independent of the educational
achievement of the nation's citizens, there is little doubt that our economic progress is,
nonetheless, retarded by the cost of remedial schooling and employee screening.
In addition to measuring school success, comparisons of student achievement
force proponents of America's education bureaucracy to demonstrate the success of
"calculated experimentation, monitoring . . and readjustment." ° For example, since
the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983, student performance has shown no significant improvement, despite repeated efforts at experimentation within the existing government structure." Additionally, while there is no guarantee that all districts will
experience improvements in academic outcomes as a result of school choice, the process of true free market competition does make one guarantee: those schools that fail
to perform in the educational marketplace will be eliminated or absorbed by the
schools which do succeed. As such, the change of process which reform opponents
bemoan as "antidemocratic" 42 should provide faster and more effective response to
the demands of citizens than our current educational bureaucracy.
Today, any crisis that has been attributed to the conduct of public education is
premised on the competence and literacy of our students. Because few would argue
that intellectual ability has been declining in recent generations, and because our public
schools are the only American institutions charged solely with the responsibility of
educating our society, lower academic achievement is attributed to less effective
schools. If comprehension of essential concepts and the development of higher level
reasoning can be measured by criteria other than student performance on standardized
assessments, opponents of educational reform have declined to offer any suggestions.
In the absence of any alternative method for assessment of public school achievement,
educational comparisons continue to offer feedback on the development or stagnation
of the public school system.

would amount to barely 0.5% of the nationwide education budget.

Id.
39.

OFFICE OF EDUC. RES. AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NATIONAL EXCELLENCE:

A

CASE FOR DEVELOPING AMERICA'S TALENT (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL EXCELLENCE].
40. See HENIG, supra note 27, at 51.
41.

See, e.g., OFFICE OF EDUC. RES. AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., YOUTH INDICA-

TORS, 1991: TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN YourTH (1991). The report found that
"[a]mong students in groups of advanced and developing countries, U.S. students had a mediocre performance on an international test of science proficiency" despite the fact that "comparatively few [United States students] were in the advanced science classes that qualified them to participate in the examinations." Id. at 75. The study additionally found that fewer than half of our high school graduates

could locate information in a news article, balance a checkbook or follow travel directions. Id.
42.

See HENIG, supra note 27, at 51 ("The market-based reform plans that are my primary focus

can be antidemocratic in substance, a fact that the current momentum of the 'do something' movement
temporarily obscures.").
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b. A StatisticalAnalysis of Student Achievement
Studies of the overall achievement of American students43 over time have suggested that America's global competitors are increasing their educational advantage
over the United States." Opponents of educational reform often claim that international assessments make inappropriate comparisons, since other nations test only their
college-bound students, while in the United States most American students are tested.' The obvious conclusion is that if top American students were compared to their
foreign counterparts, the United States would compare favorably. Unfortunately, this
conclusion lacks empirical support. According to a 1993 study conducted by the United States Department of Education, tests of the brightest students from thirteen countries ranked Americans ninth in physics, eleventh in chemistry and thirteenth in biology. The American students chosen were high school seniors taking advanced placement courses. Author David Harmer commenting on this research noted, "In short,
America's best science students are the industrialized world's worst."47 The same results have been found in math. In a 1986 report by the Carnegie Forum on Education
and the Economy, American eighth-grade students ranked thirteenth out of fifteen
countries on comprehensive international mathematics comparisons.' Further, al-

43. The response of United States public school educators to poor comparisons on international
studies of student achievement has been to refuse to take part in studies. Bracey, supra note 26, at
153-55. Tyack and Cuban have similarly observed the response of educators to increased accountability
for student achievement.
When educators view reform demands as inappropriate, they are skilled in finding ways
to temper or evade their effects. They may exclude low-achieving pupils from the state
examination. . . .They may raise grades for students in danger of violating the no-pass,
no-play rule in athletics. . . .When it becomes apparent that enormous numbers of students may be failing promotional or graduation examinations . . . educators may adjust
the cut-off points on the tests.
TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22, at 79. Unfortunately, these practices have the potential to reinforce
the conclusion that the system of public education in the United States lacks accountability and competition, two characteristics generally understood to be handicaps of monopolies.
44. See, e.g., J.P. KEEVES, LEARNING SCIENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD: CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES
OF SCIENCE ACHIEVEMENT, 1970 TO 1984 14 (1988). Keeves notes that the International Association
for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement performed detailed studies comparing science achievement of fourteen-year-old students from various nations. From 1970 to 1984, eight of the ten countries examined registered significant gains, the results for one country remained static, and there was
evidence of a sizeable drop in the achievement level for the United States. While other students
showed an average gain equivalent to half a year of schooling in science, American students lost the
equivalent of two years.
Furthermore, the overall American ranking in mathematics was low in the Second International
Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP-2). Gerald W. Bracey, The Fourth Bracey Report on the
Condition of Public Education, 76 PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 115, 117 (1994). Specifically, American nineyear-olds placed ninth out of ten nations tested in IAEP-2 mathematics, while American thirteen-yearolds placed fourteenth out of fifteen tested nations in mathematics. EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERV.,
SECOND INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS 18, 84 (1992).
45. See Bracey, supra note 44, at 117.
46. See NATIONAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 39, at 9.
47. See HARMER, supra note 2, at 16.
48. CARNEGIE FORUM ON EDUC. AND THE ECON., A NATION PREPARED: TEACHERS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 16 (1986); see also RAY MARSHALL & MARC TUCKER, THINKING FOR A LIVING 63-75, 11214 (1992). Marshall and Tucker discuss the recommendations of the Carnegie Foundation and data
regarding trends in American public school educational achievement. As the authors explain, while
math and science achievement among American students has provided cause for alarm, achievement in
other core areas has suffered as well. They note the findings of the Educational Testing Service, which
suggest that schools are not fostering students' development of analytical skills.
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though the most recent international comparison by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) showed the United States scoring high in
reading and near average in science, the suggested improvement in American scores
occurred only because the O.E.C.D. omitted five countries that had outscored the United States in previous O.E.C.D. studies.49 Finally, while there is ample evidence for
the claim that American schools may be failing to properly educate the majority of
their students, it is noteworthy that we have also neglected to challenge our most gifted
children. According to a 1993 report by the Department of Education, gifted elementary school students are currently required to attend classes where they have mastered
thirty-five to fifty percent of the curriculum before the school year starts." Further, in
addition to impeding the educational development of both gifted and challenged students, poor methods of instruction may influence the choice to forgo the completion of
a student's formal education. indeed, sudents at every skill level have been found less
likely to reach graduation in public schools as compared to their private school counterparts. 5
If the actual decline in academic performance of American students does not
point to a decline in the quality of the education they are receiving, it is instructive to
examine the quality of today's teaching materials. According to John Taylor Gatto,
New York State's Teacher of the Year for 1991, "Pick up a fifth-grade math or rhetoric textbook from 1850 and you'll see that the texts were pitched then on what would
'
today be considered college level."52
Moreover, empirical evidence supports Gatto's
first-hand account. Donald Hayes of Cornell University took 766 elementary and secondary school texts published from 1860 to 1991, and designed a computerized scoring
system to determine the comparative difficulty of reading them. He explained that "the
texts for the fourth through eighth grade have been declining since 1965, and now are
the simplest they've ever been."53 Hayes explained that it is not that students have

Fewer than 4 in 10 young adults can summarize in writing the main argument from a
lengthy news column . . . . Only 25 out of 100 young adults can use a bus schedule to
select the appropriate bus for a given departure or arrival . . . . Only 10 percent of the
total group can select the least costly product from a list of grocery items on the basis
of unit-pricing information ....
Id. at 67 (citing EDUCATIONAL TEFTING SERv., THE WRITING REPORT CARD, 1984-1988 (1989)).
49. False Positive, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1994, at C6. The five nations omitted from the
O.E.C.D. comparison included Korea, Taiwan, Hungary and the then-Soviet Union. The omission of
these nations was noted by Brookings Institute scholar and former Education Under-Secretary Diane
Ravitch.
50. NATIONAL ExcELLENCE, supra note 39, at 14.
51. See HARMER, supra note 2, at 71-73. Harmer cites a University of Maryland study showing
that merely attending a Catholic rather than public school raises the disadvantaged student's probability
of completing high school and entering a four-year college by twenty percent. Harmer also notes that
the government school dropout rate is twice that of independent schools, and that six years after high
school graduation, only thirteen percent of government school students have bachelors' degrees, compared with thirty-one percent of independent school graduates. See also Christine Bowditch, Getting Rid
of Troublemakers: High School Disciplinary Procedures and the Production of Dropouts, 40 SOCIAL
PROB. 493, 506-07 (1993) (examining the routine disciplinary procedures in inner-city public education
and concluding that public schools help to perpetuate racial and class stratification by adding to the
student dropout rate through the exercise of often unnecessary discipline against those students who are
inherently at the greatest risk of dropping out).
52. JOHN TAYLOR GA't-ro, DUMBING US DOWN 13 (1992).
53. Donald P. Hayes, Have Curriculum Changes Caused SAT Scores to Decline?, Address at the
88th meeting of the American Sociological Association (Aug. 13-17, 1993) (transcript available through
Sociological Abstracts, Inc.).
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less intellectual ability today, but54 that "they haven't gotten from the schools the depth
of knowledge they used to get.
2. StructuralImpediments to Improving Student Performance
a. Bureaucracy and Focus of Attention away from Core Educational Concerns
The question of why we are losing ground or failing to improve in international
educational assessments may best be explained by reference to how our public school
system operates. Education, like other industries, involves producers and consumers
whose interests are often in conflict.55 Unlike other industries, however, the public
education system is a monopoly, with exclusive access to public funds controlled by a
government which provides the service. This characteristic acts as a disincentive to
improvement. Because teachers and public school administrators act as both the service
provider and the representative of the consumers receiving the service, they are free to
place their interests before those of the consumer. In fact, these producers employ the
largest union in the country to do so.' It has been noted that the basic function of the
teachers unions is to increase benefits to the teachers while staving off criticism and
competition-two necessary factors behind innovation in free markets. 57 Because
many Americans lack the money necessary to take their business elsewhere and enroll
their children in private institutions, there is little incentive for public schools to become more efficient, effective or responsive to their customers.SS

54. Id. This conclusion is further informed by the work of author Avis Carlson, who describes the
rigors of obtaining an eighth-grade diploma in a small Kansas town in 1907. AvIs CARLSON, SMALL
WORLD LONG GONE: A FAMILY RECORD OF AN ERA 83-84 (1975). The author recounts having to define panegyric, talisman, triton and misconception, calculate the interest on an eight percent note for
$900 running two years, two months and six days, name countries producing large quantities of wheat,
cotton, coal and tea, give an account of the "colleges, printing, and religion in the colonies prior to
the American Revolution," and "name the principal political questions which have been advocated since
the Civil War and the party which advocated each." Id.
55. LiEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 47; see also RINEHART & LEE, supra note 2, at 4-5. See generally SAMUEL L. BLUMENTHAL, NEA: TROJAN HORSE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1984) (examining
the conflict between the union's promotion of public school teachers' interests and the larger need for
more effective methods of transmitting education).
56. See BERUBE, supra note 23, at 3, 17, 47-48 (describing the 2.2 million member National
Education Association as the "largest of unions" and the 600,000 member American Federation of
Teachers as "the collective bargaining representative in such megacities as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Detroit, San Francisco and St. Louis"); see also Peyser, supra note
19, at 622 (noting the size of the National Education Association by reference to its annual budget of
$750 million and annual political action fund of $22.5 million).
57. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 285-86. Lieberman illustrates this point by reference to a
union proposal for the management of parental complaints against teachers, which required the parent
to put the complaint in writing and confront the teacher and the teacher's union representative, and
which held that the teacher could not be dismissed on the basis of a parental complaint. Lieberman
contrasted this system with private sector management, which typically facilitates the expression of consumer complaints to avoid the loss of business. In this respect, Stephen Chapman has suggested that
the National Education Association "has only one purpose: to further the interests of teachers. It has
made clear that the interests of teachers and the interests of education don't necessarily coincide."
BERUBE, supra note 23, at 8 (quoting Stephen Chapman).
58. See Carol Blue Muller, The Social and Political Consequences of Increased Public Support for
Private Schools, in PUBLIC DOLLARS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS 39, 49 (Thomas James & Henry M. Levin eds., 1983) (observing that private school tuition acts as a "protective tariff that prevents private
schools from competing with public schools"); see also HARMER, supra note 2, at 82. Harmer observes,
Since the government schools have a captive market, they don't need to improve to keep
their customers; most customers have nowhere else to go. Occasionally a great success
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One complement to the anti-competitive nature of the public school monopoly is
the political process by which standard curriculum is developed. Because public
schools function as part of a command economy, parents have very little influence
over the development of curriculum.59 The mechanism for consumer influence over a
command economy is legislation, and for the latter part of this century, the focus of
legislative efforts with respect to education have centered on racial and social equality.
According to advocates of school reform, the result has been a de-emphasis on core
subjects and a politically unassailable growth of special programs. Examples of these
educational objectives include widely offered courses in AIDS education, consumer
education and sensitivity education, each of which takes valuable public school resources away from instruction of core offerings.' One result, reported in Adult Literacy in America, a 1993 report from the National Center for Education Statistics, is that
nearly half of adult Americans are barely literate, with such limited reading and writing skills that many of them cannot perform simple tasks such as writing a letter explaining a billing error.6 This finding is cause for even greater concern when compared to the educational development of the next generation of American adults. According to the 1992 International Assessment of Educational Progress scores, American
thirteen-year-olds rank among the worst performers of students in fifteen industrialized
nations on science and math achievement tests.62 One conclusion to be derived from
these reports is that greater time and instruction must be returned to core curriculum if

story emerges from somewhere in the system or from the independent schools-and most
government schools keep right on doing what they were already doing. Success is barely
observed, when in a free market it would be assiduously imitated.
Id. Moreover, the dearth of competition in the education marketplace attracts less qualified applicants
to teaching. See CARNEGIE FORUM ON EDUC. AND THE ECON., supra note 48, at 29 (1986) (comparing
the dramatic difference in mathematics and verbal SAT scores for all college-bound seniors and intended education majors and concluding "[t]hese rough measures of academic ability suggest that even with
a modest improvement in performance during the past few years, those students contemplating teaching
careers continue to lag behind the performance of the average college-bound student by a substantial
margin"); see also ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AMERICA GOES TO SCHOOL 163 (1995) ("The average
[SAT) score for aspiring teachers is 389 out of a possible 800."). In MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM (1962), Friedman notes,
If one were to seek deliberately to devise a system of recruiting and paying teachers
calculated to repel the imaginative and daring and self-confident and to attract the dull
and mediocre and uninspiring, he could hardly do better than imitate the system of requiring teaching certificates and enforcing standard salary structures that has developed in
the larger city and state-wide systems. It is perhaps surprising that the level of ability in
elementary and secondary school teaching is as high as it is under these circumstances.
The alternative system would resolve these problems and permit competition to be effective in rewarding merit and attracting ability to teaching.
Id. at 96. With the growth in size of the education bureaucracy and the continued reliance on salary
schedules influenced far more by seniority and the possession of degrees and teaching certificates than
by merit, Professor Friedman's comments have retained their validity more than a quarter-century after
the publication of Capitalism and Freedom.
59. Economists distinguish command economies from market economies because the latter are
influenced primarily by their customers while the former are controlled exclusively by the government.
60. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 165 ("As 'diversity' increases, the public school curriculum
reflects more compromises between various interest groups. These compromises result in programs and
courses that lack coherence or unity of purpose. Instead, they are a mishmash reflecting the politically
feasible, no matter how pointless they may be educationally.").
61. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OFFICE OF EDUC. RES. AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA (1993).
62. EDUC. TESTING SERV., SECOND INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS
(1992).
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we are to be educationally competitive with other nations.63
While reports of declining competitiveness in core curriculum fuel calls for educational reform, they also draw attention to the political debate over the various pur-

poses of public education. One of the questions at the center of this debate asks how,
in the absence of a system of public education, will the content of important non-core
curricula be transmitted to young Americans. School choice opponents, many of whom

have consistently championed the need for growth in non-core curricula, suggest that
the education reform movement is grounded in America's reaction to the social problems of our young people-problems which are unrelated to core curricula but which
are increasingly addressed by specialized non-core offerings.' They maintain that

63. The
informed by
school for a
TIONAL CTR.
SUMMARY

argument that educational offerings in public schools should be streamlined is further
the fact that students in other nations typically have a longer school day and attend
greater portion of the year. See A NATION AT RISK, supra note 2, at 21; see also NAFOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OFFICE OF EDUC. RES. AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,

OF THE FIRST HEARING OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATION COMMISSION ON TIME AND LEARN-

ING (1992); Ron Zambo, Elementary School Teachers' Instructional Behavior in Mathematics Problem

Solving: A Comparative Study, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Apr. 5-8, 1994) (transcript available through Office of Educational Research and
Improvement, United States Department of Education, Educational Resources Information Center) (discussing IAEP-2 results, which placed American students near the bottom of the tested countries in
mathematics achievement while South Korean students ranked near the top; offering comparative research on methods of instruction in the United States and Korea and noting that Korean students annually attend school an average of forty-four more days than students in the United States). Moreover,
employers and college educators suggest that while recent high school graduates have sufficient interpersonal and group skills, they are uniformly lacking in those attributes essential to success in the
workplace or in higher education.
It is not that they are lacking in eagerness and willingness to get along with those they
work with. However, the devastating news is that employers are convinced that their new
hires out of high schools are by and large borderline in terms of functional literacy,
their capacity to express themselves, and their basic functional skills. Most of all, they
have little in the way of capacity for high concentration or creative and skillful application of their minds to work challenges.
THE HARRIS EDUC. RES. CTR. AND THE COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AN ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION:

THE VIEw

OF EMPLOYERS,

HIGHER EDUCATORS,

THE PUBLIC,

RECENT STUDENTS,

AND

THEIR PARENTS 7 (1992).
64. See, e.g., HENIG, supra note 27, at 46 (noting that public receptiveness to the concept of an
educational crisis reflects concern over the decline of personal values among young Americans, not a
decline in the quality of education itself); see also BERLINER & BIDDLE, supra note 2, at 215 (citing
income inequality, urban decay, violence, drugs, an aging population and competing demands for funds
as obstacles which education reformers are content to ignore); HAGGERTY, supra note 2, at 70 (pointing to violence, instability of the American family unit and the decline of business and institutional
ethics as influences upon, rather than results of, the American system of public education); Bracey,
supra note 44, at 114 (suggesting that public frustration over drug use, violence and teen pregnancy
has been directed toward public schools in the absence of any accurate explanation for these social
problems). Moreover, the general concern that schools are increasingly responsible for the moral development of children has been voiced for some time.
That we have compromised this commitment [to excellence in education] is, upon reflection, hardly surprising, given the multitude of often conflicting demands we have
placed on our Nation's schools and colleges. They are routinely called on to provide
solutions to personal, social and political problems that the home and other institutions
either will not or cannot resolve. We must understand that these demands on our schools
and colleges often exact an educational cost as well as a financial one.
A NATION AT RISK, supra note 2, at 6; see also Albert Einstein, On Education, Address at the Albany, New York Celebration of the Tercentenary of Higher Education in America (Oct. 15, 1936), in
IDEAS AND OPINIONS 59 (1990). Einstein noted,

The school has always been the most important means of transferring the wealth of
tradition from one generation to the next. This applies today in an even higher degree
than in former times, for through modern development of the economic life, the family
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public receptiveness to the concept of an education crisis reflects concern over the
decline of personal values among young Americans and a disillusionment with drug
use, violence and teen pregnancy as opposed to declining literacy.' Defenders of public education conclude that the need for non-core curricula is greater than ever, and
that public schools offer the ideal forum for such programs. This theory implies that
market-based choice proposals may thwart efforts to address social problems at the
local school level by destroying one of the last open forums of debate and exchange
regarding community and societal values. In this regard, the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching has cautioned that school choice and its emphasis on the
empowerment of the individual parent should not ignore the role of the public school
system as a conduit for the development of a sense of community and civic responsibility. 66
Of course, if it is assumed that the cultivation of civic virtues and democratic
ideals is one of the main benefits of public education, an obvious mechanism for transmitting these qualities should exist. Unfortunately, however, the structure of the public
education establishment has, by many accounts, contributed to the decline in morality
and the ignorance of civic virtues among public school students. David Harmer, former
president of ExCEL, an influential California organization which advocated
California's choice proposal-Proposition 174-stated,
Schools can and should reinforce the common values necessary to the perpetuation of a free republic. Among these are an understanding of the rule of law;
an appreciation of liberty and the constitutional principles that preserve it; and
respect for the life, liberty, property and opinions of others.
Do the government schools cultivate these qualities in their students? Not
really.... The predominant trend in government schools is to maintain a posture
of undiscriminating neutrality on any matter remotely moral; these things are said
to be matters of opinion, personal, relative. Intellectual inquiry and reasoned debate
are out; exploration of feelings is in. School personnel can safely promote such
politically correct causes as environmentalism or such politically correct values as
tolerance of the unusual... but the cultivation of any qualities of character beyond
these is considered oppressive, improper and quaint."7
One possible effect of this moral neutrality in American public education was the
fact that "[a]s of 1993, the nation's 85,000 government schools were experiencing
more than 3 million crimes annually, or more than 35 crimes" per school per year."
To be sure, "[tihe family, not the school, bears primary and ultimate responsibility for
shaping the character of the child."68 At the very least, however, such statistics indicate that the public schools may not be developing civic virtues as the Carnegie Foun-

as bearer of tradition and education has been weakened. The continuance and health of
human society is therefore in a still higher degree dependent on the school than formerly.
Id. at 60.
65. See HENIO, supra note 27.
66. CARNEGE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE: A SPECIAL REPORT 83 (1992) [hereinafter CARNEGIE SPECIAL REPORT).
67. HARMER, supra note 2, at 27; see also Peyser, supra note 19, at 623 (observing that the lack
of agreement regarding national values leads to political battles over the content of educational offerings and results in watered-down curricula).
68. HARMER, supra note 2, at 29.
69. Id. at 30.
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dation suggested. One example of the difficulties public schools face in this area is the
constitutional mandate of church-state separation. Today, most schools have taken this
mandate further than the Supreme Court requires, by withdrawing almost entirely from
the moral realm. Fearful of religion or the hint of religious dogma, public school discussions of ethics and values are rare.7 ° The attempt to address intensely value-laden
issues in a neutral manner leads to programs such as the state-mandated family life
program, which New Jersey high school senior E.V. Kontorovich noted "drifted from
sex education toward sex preparation."'" As Kontorovich explained,
Amid all this hands-on instruction, of course, abstinence, which requires
neither a gadget nor training, gets short shrift. it is mentioned once in a video, but
is not assigned further discussion or study.
My sex-ed experience is far from atypical. According to the Eagleton survey,
virtually all high-school health teachers [in New Jersey] and more than half of middie-school health teachers instruct students in contraceptive methods.... Students
across the country are being exposed to contraceptive kits with mock phalluses and
cervixes....
Obviously, this is an extremely mechanistic-and limited-view of sex. In my
school, there is little difference in tone between our sex education classes and the
defensive driving courses we took in the 10th grade. Both are seen as natural, even
ubiquitous, activities that can be made safe with a few pointers.
But focusing on the physical details of sex is value-laden in itself and misleads students. It strips away the ethics that inform human sexuality. Schools
should not preach values, but there is a difference between that and pointing out
that they exist, and are inseparable from some aspects of life."
Such criticism demonstrates the antithesis of the democratic forum our public
schools are said to provide. Moreover, the idea that public school instruction is shaped
by local actors involved in democratic exchange misperceives the realities of today's

70. Interestingly, the avoidance of moral topics within the public schools receives less attention
than the treatment of morality in the private system. In fact, one of the more persuasive arguments
against school choice proposals suggests that private schools promote undemocratic thinking by the
nature of their instruction. HENRY M. LEVIN, EDUCATION AS A PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOOD 220
(1987) (discussing the probability that "Catholic schools will not tolerate open discussion of abortion,
military schools a candid discussion of disarmament, or evangelical schools a discussion of evolution").
Notwithstanding the fact that millions of Americans have been educated in private schools, with no
detriment to democracy, this argument assumes that public schools themselves provide unbiased consideration of controversial topics. This assumption ignores the possibility that actors in the public education bureaucracy might use instructional materials to promote specific ideological viewpoints at the
expense of balanced discussion or debate. See TOCH, supra note 26, at 153 (noting that an instructional unit on nuclear disarmament published by the National Education Association, the largest of the
teachers unions, urged students to collect signatures on petitions calling for a nuclear freeze and that
the unit was developed while the NEA's executive director, Terry Herndon, was President of Citizens
Against Nuclear War, an organization that operated out of National Education Association headquarters
in Washington, D.C.). Lieberman similarly describes one unit from a union-published source book for
classroom use.
In discussing "Why a Worker Joins a Union," it relies on a biographical sketch. The
sketch features an employer who explains why his employees are not working as follows: "Oh, I have plenty of work all right, but I thought it would be good psychology
to let the boys walk the streets a few days. It will put the fear of God into their
hearts." Not surprisingly, the source book does not consider the possibility that workers
might refuse to join unions for legitimate reasons.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 159.
71. E.V. Kontorovich, Sex Prep, Not Sex Ed, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1993, at A10.
72. Id.
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public school system. Increasingly, the democratic forum of the public schools has
become a myth given the centralization of the public education bureaucracy. Since
1945, the number of public school districts nationwide has fallen from over 100,000 to
fewer than 15,000." In turn, the traditional practice of local school boards operating
schools with direct accountability to parents has been replaced by a massive bureaucracy, where legislators and state educational administrators have the lion's share of discretionary authority, where teachers have little autonomy and where parents must petition their state legislature for changes they once could have achieved by attendance at
a local school board meeting.7 4 The result of this centralization is the further insulation of schools from the demands of their customers. David Harmer observed,
"Protected from competition, government school personnel face no meaningful consequences for success or failure.""5 Furthermore, as long as parents lack meaningful
and affordable alternatives to the public school system, there is no reason for public
schools to change. Ultimately, whether it is the growth of non-core curricula or the
ever-diminishing access to public school administrators, today's American public education bureaucracy impedes the responsiveness of schools to their consumers, and perpetuates a curriculum shaped largely by special interests.
b. Politics and Public School Cost Efficiency
In response to criticism of the performance of American public schools, actors in
the public system have maintained for years that American public schools are underfunded. Recently, this suggestion has been bolstered by the attention given to the decline in the infrastructure of American schools.76 Professor Myron Lieberman has discussed this development and concluded that funding is not the problem.77 School officials have strong incentives to spend revenues for immediate benefits.7" Public school
administrators recognize that taxpayers will absorb the cost of future building repairs
due to inadequate maintenance, and this frees administrators to under-invest in their
physical plant. In short, preventive maintenance is not budgeted because spending tax
revenues to avert costly repairs in the future requires a long-term outlook. By contrast,
private institutions budget for continuing, sometimes costly maintenance, since "the
owners [of the private property] not the public at large, would have to absorb the
losses due to inadequate maintenance."79
An additional inefficiency of public school expenditure is the method by which
educational programs are financed and secured. Interest groups have always sought to
implement special educational programs. Most recently, however, they have sought to

73.

NATIONAL CmT.

FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,

OFF. OF EDUC. RES. AND IMPROVEMENT,

U.S.

OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS tbl. 88 (1993) [hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUCATION

DEP'T

STA-

TISTICS].
74. DAVID BoAz, The Public School Monopoly: America's Berlin Wall, in LIBERATING SCHOOLS:
EDUCATION IN THE INNER CITY 49 (1991); see also DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING
GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 262 (1992)
(discussing the volume of studies supporting the conclusion that greater teacher autonomy leads to
increased student performance); Keller, supra note 19, at 72 (noting that even state sponsored charter
programs do not create the level of teacher autonomy enjoyed by instructors at private schools).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

HARMER, supra note 2, at 56.
See Bracey, supra note 44, at 120.
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 166.
See id.
Id.
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secure their programs from the changing demands of modem education. To avoid the
elimination of special programs due to obsolescence, interest groups seek to have them
established by legislation. Once established in this way, public schools are restrained
from terminating these programs even when they have outlived their usefulness.'
Exacerbating this inefficiency in course programming is the fact that public schools,
like other government entities, are under pressure to avoid a budget surplus at the end
of any fiscal year. Public school officials spend all available funds, often without regard to efficiency considerations, because budget surpluses can lead to a reduction in
government revenues for future years as well as teacher and taxpayer demands for
access to residual funds." These inefficiencies are passed on to taxpayers who underwrite the cost of public school education. According to United States Department of
Education statistics from 1993, the average annual per pupil cost of public education is
an estimated $5920.2 By contrast, the Department of Education reports that Catholic
schools charge an average annual tuition of $1327, while other church-sponsored private schools charge an average of $1941 and non-sectarian private schools charge an
average of $3839.3 Further, although parochial school tuition figures understate the
actual cost per student due to church subsidies, once all other costs are factored in, the
per pupil cost of parochial schools remains less than half that of government
schools.8 4 The variance in the cost of educating public and private school students is
explained by the fact that private schools spend the majority of their money on classroom instruction while public schools spend a majority of their funds on the maintenance of a bureaucracy. "For example, the Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., educates
50,000 students with a central administrative staff of 17. The government school system of Washington, D.C., with 81,000 students, has a central administrative staff of
1,500."' Competition such as that suggested by school choice proposals would en-

80. See id.
81. Id. at 166-67.
82. DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 73, at 161.
83. Id. Opponents of school choice have suggested, without authority, that the per-pupil cost of
private education meets or exceeds the per-pupil expenditure for public schooling. See Stephen K.
Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 37 (1993) (stating that
"[tihe average cost of private school tuition is between $4,000 and $5,000 per year," without citing
authority for this proposition). Even if these figures were accurate, they ignore the fact that public
schooling is still the costliest and least efficient method of education. See generally Eric Hanushek,
The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1160
(1986) (discussing the gross cost inefficiencies peculiar to the public school system); HARDAWAY,
supra note 58, at 162 ("Even [those] public schools with the very lowest per capita expenditures still
spend more than most private and parochial schools, and far more than is spent in such industrialized
countries as Japan.") (citation omitted); U.S. Schools: Shaking Up Is Hard to Do, Bus. WK., Sept. 15,
1992, at 120 (finding that administrative costs amount to as much as half of every dollar spent in
American public schools).
Despite these findings, opponents of school choice such as Professor Sharon Keller have argued
that the cost savings of private and for-profit schools rely upon the "loss of remuneration by teachers"
in these systems. Keller, supra note 19, at 96. Notwithstanding Professor Keller's assumption that
teachers' salaries in a privatized system would be reduced to the current private school level, currently
operating for-profit education providers such as Education Alternatives, Inc. are cooperatively revitalizing the administration, finances and facilities of public schools under contract, while paying teachers
the same salary that they would have been paid under union negotiated contracts in their district. See
Solomon, supra note 19, at 895-98. The savings achieved by for-profit providers such as Education
Alternatives, Inc. largely result from significant reductions in the administrative expenses of public
schools. Id.
84. DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 73, at 71.
85. HARMER, supra note 2, at 77. Further, empirical evidence suggests that large public education

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 24:21

courage the pursuit of efficiencies by placing the customer at the center of all deci-

sions regarding educational expenditures. Moreover, even without any reform to the
method of instruction currently employed by public and private schools, cost efficiency

suggests that there are strong policy reasons for underwriting the cost of students who
wish to attend private institutions." When coupled with research regarding the relationship of school spending to student performance on standardized tests, this conclusion gains merit. As Eric Hanushek observed after reviewing sixty studies attempting
to link school expenditures to student achievement, there is no such relationship, and
therefore no reason to pay for public school programs that do not work. 7
C. Barriers to the Implementation of School Choice
1. Public Misconceptions Regarding the Function of Market-Based Education
ht ute recom
tendation
of public plicy, there is always a temptation to overstate
benefits and ignore limitations. The temptation in the arena of public school finance
debate cuts both ways. Reformers frequently downplay the government's role in a
system nonetheless dependent upon tax revenues," and opponents of reform
mischaracterize choice proposals as a vehicle for redistributing tax dollars to private
institutions and the wealthy. 9 Given their tendency to mislead, these myths deserve

bureaucracies do not necessarily function more efficiently than their less specialized private school
counterparts. See TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22, at 78. Tyack and Cuban observed the problems of
accountability in the recently "decentralized" public school bureaucracy of New York City.
When a new chancellor, Joseph A. Fernandez, arrived in New York in 1990 to administer the school district, he found it was not clear who was in charge, if anyone. His
office windows were dirty, so he called an engineer to clean them. Sorry, he learned, by
contract the engineers cleaned windows only once a year. When he asked his secretary
to order highlighting pens, he was informed that delivery would take four weeks. It was
unclear just what were the prerogatives of the thirty-two decentralized school boards.
Only by negotiating with the principal's union could he change a policy that gave principals, in effect, a tenured fiefdom in a particular building.
Id.
86. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 169-70.
87. Hanushek, supra note 83, at 1167; see also JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL
ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982) (concluding that the
superior academic performance of students in Catholic schools is due to effects of the schools themselves and not to selection bias).
88. Although a number of reformers recognize the pervasive government influence on private
actors in a voucher system, others have viewed the challenges of implementation as merely peripheral.
Compare Michael Heise, Public Funds, Private Schools and the Court: Legal Issues and Policy Consequences, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 137, 149 (1993) (acknowledging that "private schools would have
to relinquish some control over their core education decisions to judges and juries") with Peyser, supra
note 19, at 624 (suggesting that, given good schools to choose from, a voucher system would "liberate
education from the clutches of politics by shifting power to parents and individual schools, at the
expense of school committees and local school departments").
89. One particularly misleading argument frequently leveled against private choice proposals maintains that parents with children currently attending private schools would receive an improper financial
benefit from the receipt of a tuition voucher. See generally Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument
Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 37, 40 (suggesting that under a voucher system,
"[u]pper income parents who can otherwise afford private education will be provided an extra bonus,
while other parents will be forced to choose between sub-quality private education and the under-funded public schools") (emphasis added).
Such arguments ignore the role of tax dollars as the very foundation of government revenues. It
is not an "extra bonus" for a tax payer to be afforded a benefit in return for their payment of taxes.
Currently, parents who choose to send their children to private school forfeit that portion of their tax
dollars allocated to education. The failure of the taxpayer to receive a benefit in this situation represents a subsidy to other taxpayers. The removal of this subsidy does not result in a "bonus," but
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examination.
Although educational choice does reserve a role for government participation and
the responsibility of government necessarily would be limited to the
regulation,
even
distribution of tax revenues and regulation of only the most essential aspects of education."° Despite these parameters, reform advocates often fail to acknowledge that implementation of new social programs rarely is successful without active involvement of
federal officials, and specific and quantitative standards for compliance with regulatory
schemes.9' Because the government's participation in implementing a new educational
system cannot be overlooked, reformers must seek to persuade current producers of
public education that the personal benefits of competition outweigh the challenges and
increased demands of a market system. Examples of such benefits include merit-based
pay and career tracks for education professionals, both of which offer monetary benefits to those educators willing to compete.
On the other side of the debate, myths regarding the purpose of educational
choice frequently have gained acceptance as a result of poor research designs and
flawed reporting. One example comes from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching's 1992 report on school choice. The Foundation mischaracterized school choice proposals when it conducted a national survey regarding public
opinion toward vouchers. 9' One question asked, "Some people think that parents
should be given a voucher which they could use to enroll their child in a private
' The report implied
school at public expense. Do you support or oppose this idea?"93
that vouchers function exclusively as a method for funneling public monies to private
institutions. In reality, the idea behind school choice is that tax vouchers distributed to
parents would be redeemable as tuition for a student's enrollment in the public, private
or for-profit school of the parent's choice. Nonetheless, the poll served to reinforce the
perception that vouchers are a method for increasing private school enrollments.

instead, merely represents the proper allocation of tax revenues to all taxpayers. This equitable distribution of educational tax dollars removes public education from the realm of social programs and
reinstates it in its intended form as a public service. As Professor McConnell has observed,
By taxing everyone, but subsidizing only those who use secular schools, the government
creates a powerful disincentive for parents to exercise their constitutionally protected
option to send their children to parochial schools. Nondiscriminatory allocation of educational resources would restore religious parents to the neutral set of incentives they faced
before the government taxed them to support secular education.
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 132 (1992).
Notwithstanding this distinction, the argument in favor of receiving a benefit from the payment
of taxes does not support a conclusion that the government has committed an Establishment Clause
violation by withholding education tax dollars from parents of children attending parochial schools. In
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), the Court stated that,
We conclude that government regulation that indirectly and incidentally calls for a choice
between securing a government benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for religious reasons.
Id. at 706.
90.

See RINEHART & LEE, supra note 2, at 127-28; see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 279-80.

91. Charles S. Bullock IIH,Conditions Associated with Policy Implementation, in IMPLEMENTATION
oF CiviL RIGHTS PouIcy (Charles S. Bullock & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1978).
92. CARNEGIE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 66, at xv.
93. Id. at 95; see also HENIG, supra note 27, at 189-90 (discussing how the wording and structure of polling questions influences analyses of the public will regarding privatization and school
choice proposals).
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The Foundation erred similarly when it sought to determine through opinion
polls the trade-offs involved in supporting choice. The Foundation posed a question to
American adults about "how, in their view, American public education would best be
improved. 94 The question asked:
Please imagine two people having a discussion on how to improve the public
schools in this country. Mr. Smith says: The best way to improve education is to
focus directly on supporting neighborhood schools, giving every school the resources needed to achieve excellence. Mr. Jones says: The best way to improve education is to let schools compete with each other for students. Quality schools would
be further strengthened and weak schools would improve or close.
Who are you more likely to agree with, Mr. Smith, who would support every
neighborhood school, or Mr. Jones, who would let schools compete for students?95
Not surprisingly, more than eighty percent of respondents favored empowering neighborhood schools.' Unfortunately, the question is misleading. To begin, it suggests
that we currently possess the government resources necessary to bring every school to
a level of academic excellence, notwithstanding the fact that this position has been
disproven by over twenty years of school finance reform litigation and judicial mandates for finance equalization.97 Moreover, it perpetuates the myth that increased
funding will inspire improvement in public education despite declining performance in
the face of a federal education budget which, adjusted for inflation, has increased forty
percent since 1982 and has tripled since 1960.98 While the avowed purpose of the
question was to determine the trade-offs involved in supporting choice, the question
compares resource expansion to competition. Such comparisons are confounded by human nature, which prefers concepts of abundance to programs involving the allocation
of scarce resources. Because tax revenues for educational funding are limited, the
suggestion that debate over education reform simply requires a choice between increased funding and market mechanisms is flawed. This flaw is exacerbated further by

94. CARNEGIE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 11-12.
95. Id.at 13.
96. Id.
97. See generally GARMS Er AL., supra note 8 (examining school finance equalization strategies
and the reasons for their failure); Note, supra note 10, at 1078-80 (noting barriers to the implementation of judicial mandates of reform include disproportionate influence of property-rich districts and
collective action problems resulting from voter unwillingness to pay the higher taxes associated with
school finance remedies); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the inadequacy of existing political solutions to school finance equalization).
98. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 2, at 101 (citing U.S. Department of Education statistics); see also
JAMES S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUcATIONAL OPPORTUNiTY 295-97 (1966) (maintaining that academic achievement is driven by family influences rather than educational offerings and school facilities); HARDAWAY, supra note 58, at 15 (observing that teacher salaries increased by eighteen percent
in real dollars between 1970 and 1995); RINEHART & LEE, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that budgetary
expansion has led to a reduction in public school student-teacher ratios of almost one-third since
1960); Hanushek, supra note 83, at 1162 (finding no correlation between school expenditures and
student achievement); John E. McDermott & Stephen P. Klein, The Cost-Quality Debate in School
Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 415 (1974) (finding
insufficient evidence to identify a cost-quality correlation in education); Michael J. Churgin et al.,
Note, A Statistical
Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81
YALE LJ. 1303 (1972) (concluding that no direct correlation exists between individual and district
property wealth in Connecticut, and suggesting that public school finance equalization efforts intended
to pool individual property tax revenues across districts are flawed).
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the question's design, which pits Mr. Smith, who would support every neighborhood
school against Mr. Jones, who would leave the schools' survival up to the market."(
This contrast implies that supporters of competition are signing a death warrant for
public education. As David Harmer has commented, "concern over the fate of the
public education system is widespread and almost irrational. ''"" ° Yet, Harmer notes,
Maintaining a system isn't our goal; teaching children is. The government school
system is a means to that end, not an end in itself. Failure to make that distinction
distorts most discussions of educational reform, which tend to center on how to
shore up the present system rather than how to teach children.' 0 '
Harmer's comments have direct application to the design of the Carnegie Foundation's
questions. As long as research efforts continue to focus on the need for greater capital
and greater public support, the goal of greater student achievement-itself the purpose
of any education reform movement-will be overshadowed.
2. A Free Market Analysis of the Milwaukee Experiment: Is This What We Can
Expect?
Much has been written about the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the nation's most comprehensive experiment with school choice to date." 2 According to the
1992 special report on school choice by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching, "Promises have outdistanced reality in Milwaukee."' 3 One of the main
factors leading to the Foundation's conclusions was the small number of participants in
the program. According to the Carnegie Foundation, "Thus far, only about six hundred
of the 97,000 Milwaukee public school students have switched to a private
school. ''""A The Foundation's report, however, brushed aside two highly relevant facts
regarding the small number of choice participants. First, the report makes brief mention that the reason for participation of only 632 students in 1992 was the fact that
there were only 936 seats originally available in the program. The remaining 304
seats in the program were filled when it began, but those students chose not to return
to their alternative school the following year, and no effort was made to fill these
vacated seats within the program. Moreover, the report also mischaracterized the Milwaukee plan as a private choice initiative, despite the fact that religious and for-profit
schools were excluded from participation while all Milwaukee public schools were

99. CARNEGIE SPECiAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 13.
100. HARMER, supra note 2, at 7; see also Bennett, supra note 2, at 20, 36 (explaining his view
that schools are a service provider that do not exist merely for their own benefit, but instead exist for
the benefit of the student).
101. HARMER, supra note 2, at 7.
102. Robert J. Bruno, Constitutional Analysis of Educational Vouchers in Minnesota, 53 EDUC. L.
REP. 9 (1989); Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the Polemic
of Legal Problems Be Overcome, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1993); James B. Egle, The Constitutional
Implications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 459 (1992); Green, supra note 83, at 62; Michael
E. Hartmann, Cleaning Up with Banquo's Ghost in the Dairyland, 27 AKRON L. REV. 445 (1993); Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 423
(1995); Julie K. Underwood, Choice in Education: The Wisconsin Experience, 68 EDUC. L. REP. 229
(1991).
103. CARNEGIE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 19.
104. Id. at 18.
105. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 11.
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included."° According to the Carnegie Foundation, "Simply put, while a handful of
students may have benefitted, the Milwaukee plan appears, thus far, to have done little
or nothing to help one of our most troubled school systems."'"
The Carnegie report's conclusion was largely inconsistent with the goals and
expectations of the experiment. The Wisconsin Legislature presumably did not expect
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program to revitalize an educational system of 97,000
students by offering private choice to less than 1000 of them. Moreover, drawing conclusions about the value of school choice by reference to the Milwaukee voucher program is misguided. The problem lies in the fact that the Milwaukee plan did not create
a competitive market system. Bureaucratic and structural limitations on the plan eliminated the possibility that schools could function as true market competitors. For example, participation was limited to one percent of enrollment in Milwaukee public
schools, or 936 students."r Also, no school could be made up of more than fortynine percent voucher students, religious and for-profit schools were excluded, and the
amount of the voucher was set at fifty-three percent of the average amount spent per
pupil in the Milwaukee schools in 1990-91, approximately $2500."° As a result,
these legislative limits precluded the emergence of a competitive market. For example,
the small scale of the program made it impossible to achieve economies of scale in
employment, purchasing and other basic operations."' Additionally, because for-profit schools were excluded, entrepreneurs had no entry into the marketplace, and because
the number of voucher-redeeming pupils could not exceed one percent of public school
enrollments, public schools had no need to fear competition from voucher-redeeming
schools."'
Despite these limitations, few reformers oppose the Milwaukee plan. Instead,
their concern is that it will be regarded as a true test of a market system of education.
As Professor Myron Lieberman explains, "The Milwaukee plan is likely to turn out
poorly precisely because it is not a competitive market system of education."" 2 Until
a true competitive market experiment is implemented, conclusions regarding the efficacy of a market system of education are premature.

106. Id. at 12.
107. CARNEGIE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 19.
108. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 11.
109. Id. at 12; see also Underwood, supra note 102, at 230 (pointing out several additional requirements imposed by the Wisconsin Legislature, including a required average attendance rate of
ninety percent, the satisfaction of minimum parental involvement criteria and the mandate that qualifying families must not have income greater than 175% of the federal poverty level).
110. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 12.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 13. Moreover, general confusion regarding what a voucher system entails interferes with
public acceptance of voucher proposals. Not only are vouchers frequently mischaracterized as methods
of transmitting public funds to private schools, they have also been described as a method of channeling students to public schools offering specialized curricula, a concept similar to magnet schools. See
Keller, supra note 19, at 72. ("Similarly, vouchers involve the incorporation of parental choice in the
assignment of students to public schools with specialized offerings; in this way they are essentially
similar to magnet schools."). Although this view of voucher plans may loosely fit the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, it is inconsistent with any of the four current legislative models of choice:
Intra-district Public Choice, Inter-district Public Choice, Market-Oriented Public Choice, and Private
Choice. See generally supra note 13.
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3. The Reality of Implementing Sweeping Reforms
Assuming public misconceptions of market-based choice proposals can be overcome, the true challenge will be the implementation of a voucher system. It has been
suggested that a legislative or judicial victory for school choice supporters may not
result in the alternatives they expect."' Because school choice will have to be implemented by local school districts and school boards, the implementation of a market
system is subject to reformation by recalcitrant bureaucrats. John Chubb and Terry
Moe have commented that the administrative process affords educators and public
school administrators the opportunity to impose rules or procedures limiting student
access to private and for-profit schools." 4 Administrative review procedures which
could be employed to limit access to the market include regulations regarding: "1)
compliance with zoning ordinances; 2) construction of facilities meeting state, county
and local building codes and fire and safety regulations; 3) state or local regulation of
a private [or for-profit] school; 4) teacher qualifications and pupil teacher ratios; and 5)
curriculum requirements.""' 5 This list is expanded when one considers the social fallout associated with the elimination of a long-standing cultural and psychological investment in public education." 6 Moreover, by merely expanding regulatory mandates,
current administrators in the public school system could limit the flexibility of market
entrants and increase their costs." 7
Against this backdrop, attacks may be made against a choice system based on the
claim that powerful for-profit and private schools will discriminate against students.
The idea is that organized suburban constituencies or coalitions of private schools
would force the gradual elimination of the equalizing elements of school choice."'
Such discriminatory practices might include, for example, restrictive admission based
upon geographic location and transportation costs. Ultimately, attempts to benefit the
advantaged while reversing the redistributive effects of school choice for the disadvantaged could do more harm to the political longevity of choice legislation than administrative resistance to market entrants.
The possibility, however, that opponents of school choice could erect administrative barriers to competition while also attempting to discredit competitive schools is
unlikely. For example, the same school choice program which must ultimately be
implemented by local school districts and education professionals with their own agendas is not likely to be co-opted by isolated communities interested in tuition add-ons
and restrictive 'xlmissions. In short, a legislatively mandated system implemented by
professionals in the existing school system is unlikely to revert to a standard which is

113. See HENIG, supra note 27, at 183 (claiming that well-organized parent groups and coalitions
of private schools could eventually force the erosion of the equalizing elements of vouchers through
the institution of anti-competitive measures such as tuition add-ons); LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 295
(arguing that uncritical support for voucher plans with anti-competitive provisions, such as those in the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, could be as damaging to lower and secondary education as the
current public school monopoly); Solomon, supra note 19, at 928 (observing that public school teachers, administrators and their unions could block the growth of for-profit schools through the use of
restrictive regulations over zoning, facility construction, teacher qualifications and student-teacher ratios).
114. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 2, at 309.
115. Solomon, supra note 19, at 928.
116. LIEBERmAN, supra note 2, at 296; see also Bennett, supra note 2, at 20.
117. Solomon, supra note 19, at 930.
118. HENIG, supra note 27, at 184; see also BERLINER & BIDDLE, supra note 2, at 175-77.
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socially and politically undesirable. Although the market will govern developments in
school structure and techniques, legal and social barriers to the development of discriminatory practices will continue to exist in the education market as they do in other
markets.
Finally, in addition to potential administrative barriers to the adoption of a free
market for pre-collegiate education, the possibility that reform efforts could fail to
meet public expectations or that perceived improvements could overshadow actual
progress, deserves attention. The great educational reforms of this century ultimately
adapted to fit within the existing system of education."9 Some reforms began with
unrealistic expectations while others had modest initial goals that expanded after capturing the imagination of the public. 2° In the end, the structure of public education
changed far more than its substance.
While such observations carry historical importance they are not readily applicable to discussions of a competitive market for education because a competitive market
naturally allows for competing views of the substance and structure of the ideal school.
Under a free market system, some schools would undoubtedly resist change. Others
however would embrace reform, allowing for the success or failure of individual reforms to be determined. Further, the related concern that a competitive market for
education could place profit and perception of academic excellence ahead of actual
improvements in academic achievement ignores the fact that the free market responds
to public demand for information about the success or failure of educational programs.
With independent organizations rendering opinions on the quality of individual institutions, and the corresponding possibility of losing students to more competitive
schools, administrators would have the proper incentive to pursue better methods of
education.
There is no doubt that implementing a reform as ambitious as school choice
presents an array of difficulties. Logistics and transportation problems, inequality of
opportunity between rural and urban citizens, the ambivalence of some parents toward
the selection of a school and the possibility of inadvertent resegregation are among the
chief concerns of choice opponents."2 Most of these problems, however, already exist within the current public school system. Moreover, these problems merely comple-

119. TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22, at 64-84 (analyzing reforms such as the introduction of
kindergartens and junior high schools and juxtaposing the ambitious goals of reformers against the
homogenizing effects of the public school system); see also Michael W. Kirst, The State Role in
School Restructuring, in EDUCATION REFORM IN THE 90's 31 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Theodore
Rebarber eds., 1990) ("Schools may confuse restructuring with merely intensifying the existing school
system, or see the state restructuring program as just another funding source."); HENIG, supra note 27.
Henig has observed that,
Market-based choice reforms are intended to change the process by which school-related
decisions are made. Advocates presume that such changes in process will translate into
changes in what actually goes on inside the classroom-the substance of education-but
the link between process and substance is at best indirect. Part of the popularity of the
choice proposals depends on different groups projecting their own vision of what the
substantive consequences will be. More of them than not are destined to be disappointed.
Id. at 51.
120. See generally TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 22, at 66-67 (examining how enthusiasm for kindergartens transformed the limited goal of softening a child's entry into the classroom into the unrealistic expectation that kindergartens could "rescue children and their parents from poverty and crime,
turn immigrants into Americans, [and even] solve 'the race problem"').
121. RINEHART & LEE, supra note 2, at 141-58.
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ment the poor academic performance of our public school students on national and
international assessments. After more than three decades of incremental reform, the
very method of dispensing education in this country has now come under scrutiny.
While legislative alternatives to the current system exist,. if they are to succeed
they will have to garner both public support and judicial endorsement. Of these two, it
is the latter which has the most exacting standards.
I.

SCHOOL CHOICE AS THE NEXT ARENA IN FINANCE REFORM
LITIGATION
A. Legal Challenges to School Choice
1. Federal ConstitutionalConstraints

Because the creation of a competitive market for educational services would
employ the use of public, private and for-profit schools, the federal constitutional challenges to privatization aim at the elimination of both private and for-profit competitors.
Legal assaults on the inclusion of private schools in choice proposals focus on concerns over the use of public funds for religious purposes. This approach has wide
appeal for opponents of choice since private educational institutions are largely sectarian. 22 Additionally, challenges to for-profit schools may attempt to eliminate cost-efficiencies in education by mandating strict adherence to cumbersome regulations currently imposed upon America's public schools. Although the full scope of federal constitutional challenges to the adoption of school choice legislation is not yet known, it is
likely that the mechanism for these challenges will be found in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Legislators interested in the implementation of choice proposals
should recognize the implications of these federal constitutional arguments.
a. The Establishment Clause
[W]e have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily
subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may
also receive an attenuated financial benefit.'
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits government from
establishing a state religion or restraining the free exercise of any individual's religion. 24 Not surprisingly, the distribution of public funds for use by religious institutions implicates the Establishment Clause. It has been suggested that the use of public
tax dollars for private schooling is an issue implicating strict constitutional prohibitions."2 The theory notes that any public funds distributed to religious schools increase those schools' budgets, thereby aiding religion. Indeed, while the use of public

122. DIGEsT OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 73, at 69; see also Heise, supra note 88, at
139 (noting that "approximately 81% of America's private schools are associated with religious institutions, and these religious schools educate 84% of private school students").
123. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I
125. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 409, 443-51 (1986) (referring to the implication of strict constitutional prohibitions by the use of
public tax dollars for private schooling as the "no-aid" theory); McConnell, supra note 89, at 127-34
(noting that the Court's decision in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), "effectively
required the parochial schools to secularize their curriculum if they wished to receive assistance").
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funds may be restricted to non-sectarian courses, the public subsidy still bolsters the
religious schools' resources, and schools with greater resources can invest more in

their religious programs or expand the number of students to whom they teach religion
by lowering tuition. 6 Notwithstanding this theory, the United States Supreme Court
has pursued several methodological approaches which permit some degree of state
assistance to religious schools.'
One view adopted by the Court in Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind' holds that the state's decision to provide educational funds to individuals, even where those individuals may apply the funds to a religious education, does
not result in the establishment of religion.'" In Witters, the State offered scholarships
for the vocational training of the blind. Larry Witters was denied the use of his scholarship because he wished to use it for training as a church youth director or pastor.
The Supremc Court h.cld that because the program did not have the principal or pr, ary effect of advancing religion, 3 ° the availability3 of the scholarship for religious education did not violate the Establishment Clause.1 '
The Court has come to a similar conclusion where states have chosen to provide
special aid to students: 32 the Constitution does not compel states to discriminate
against individuals receiving education in religiously affiliated schools.'33 The Court
has not gone so far, however, to say that states are required to spend as much money
on students in religious schools as they spend on students in public schools. In fact,
the closest the Court has come to mandating equality of funding between public and
private education can be found in the dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Meek v.
Pittenger. 31 There, the Chief Justice argued that because parents have the constitutional right to send their child to a religious school, and because states refuse to fund
sectarian institutions, the decision to attend a religious school requires a parent to
forfeit the state educational subsidy which their child would receive in a public
school.3 3 The Chief Justice considered this practice to be a violation of the Four-

126. Although the Supreme Court disagreed with this view in Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), when it upheld public bus transportation to religious schools, the Court implicitly supported the idea when it later prohibited the lending of instructional materials to religious schools on
Establishment Clause grounds in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977).
127. The Court has allowed state assistance to parochial schools in the following cases: Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (sign language interpreters); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (state scholarships); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (state income tax deductions); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks on
loan); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bus rides).
128. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
129. Id. at 487 (although noting that it is "well settled . . . that the State may not grant aid to a
religious school, whether cash or in-kind, where the effect of the aid is 'that of a direct subsidy to
the religious school' from the State," the Court upheld the legislation explaining that "[a]ny aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a
result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients").
130. Id. at 488.
131. Id. at 488-89 ("On the facts presented here, we think the Washington program works no state
support of religion prohibited by the Establishment Clause.").
132. See infra note 138.
133. Id.
134. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). The foundation of this
argument is further developed in McConnell, supra note 89, at 132.
135. As the Chief Justice explained,
The melancholy consequence of what the Court does today is to force the parent to
choose between the "free exercise" of a religious belief by opting for a sectarian educa-
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teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.'36
In addition to refusing to adopt Burger's call for equal treatment with respect to
educational funding, the Court has applied a variety of different methodologies to
distinguish permissible from impermissible aid to religious schools. 3 For example,
the Court has held programs providing for the loan of materials to religious schools to
be prohibited by the Establishment Clause, 3 while educational funds distributed to
parents--either through tax deductions, the distribution of state funds directly to the
aid recipient or assumption by the state of otherwise private costs-have been upheld
by the Court, even when the benefits were used for some aspect of religious education. 39 The approach in this line of cases is frequently referred to as the "child benefit theory," a term derived from the Court's decision in Cochran v. Louisiana Board of
Education.4 The significance of the child benefit theory iies in the distinction it
makes between direct and indirect aid to religion. Under the theory, aid which directly
benefits a religious institution is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, while aid

tion for his child or to forgo the opportunity for his child to learn to cope with-or
overcome-serious congenital learning handicaps, through remedial assistance financed by
his taxes. Affluent parents, by employing private teaching specialists, will be able to
cope with this denial of equal protection, which is, for me, a gross violation of
Fourteenth Amendment rights, but all others will be forced to make a choice between
their judgment as to their children's spiritual needs and their temporal need for special
remedial learning assistance.
Meek, 421 U.S. at 387.
136. Id.
137. Among the more distinct methodologies adopted by the Court or proposed by its members are
the "child benefit" theory of Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), the
"Lemon test" of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the "tracing theory," largely developed in
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the "endorsement test" proposed by Justice O'Connor in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), and
the "coercion test" outlined by Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
138. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977) ("In view of the impossibility of
separating the secular education function from the sectarian, the state aid inevitably flows in part in
support of the religious role of the schools."); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 350 (1975) ("The
massive aid that nonpublic schools thus receive is neither indirect nor incidental, and even though such
aid is ostensibly limited to secular instructional material and equipment the inescapable result is the
direct and substantial advancement of religious activity.").
139. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)
(describing the lack of state action in the application of program funds, Justice Marshall held, "Aid
recipients' choices are made among a huge variety of possible careers, of which only a small handful
are sectarian. In this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to support
religious education is made by the individual, not by the State"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400
(1983) (refening to an income tax deduction available to parents of students attending private or public
schools, Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court noted, "[the historic purposes of the [Establishment]
Clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the
private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally
available tax benefit at issue in this case"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("[The
First]
Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary . . . . [Clutting off church schools
from these [social] services, so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function,
would make it far more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of
the First Amendment."). But see Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 798 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828 (1973). In Nyquist and Sloan aid which was
formally given to parents, and not directly to religious schools, was nonetheless invalidated.
140. Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (stating that the State's purchase of
textbooks for public as well as private school students is constitutionally permissible, since "the legislation does not segregate private schools, or their pupils, as its beneficiaries. . . .Individual interests are
aided only as the common interest is safeguarded").
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which benefits all students neutrally, without reference to religion, is permissible. 41
Consequently, benefits which are passed directly to the parent, who in turn chooses to
apply them to religious or secular education, may be permissible. Directing the aid to
the parent may be seen as an indication that those programs focus directly on the
transmission of education, and only incidentally and occasionally accommodate religion. The decision to direct aid to the parent rather than the parochial school alone,
however, is insufficient to overcome Establishment Clause scrutiny. 42
Finally, the Court has made various attempts to categorize the activities of religious schools, breaking them down into components which it could label as religious
or secular. 43 The Court then approves aid in only those situations where the money
is applied to a wholly secular purpose. The application of this approach, frequently referred to as the "tracing theory," has resulted in sometimes confusing, often indistinguishable siCousionls by the Court. I
(1) Lemon v. Kurtzman
Underlying the analysis of constitutionality in many of these cases is the threshold test created in the 1971 decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman.4 Despite significant
modification, this position continues to influence the Court's treatment of government
aid to religious schools." Under the Lemon framework, the constitutionality of stat-

141. Id. at 374-75.
142. In Wolman v Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977), Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
addressed the singular practice of directing aid to parents rather than parochial institutions.
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist. . . [t]he state attempted to justify the
program, as Ohio does here, on the basis that the aid flowed to the parents rather than
to the church-related schools. The Court observed, however, that unlike the bus program
in Everson v. Board of Education, and the book program in Allen, there "has been no
endeavor 'to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions
and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the former."' The Court thus found
that the grant program served to establish religion. If a grant in cash to parents is impermissible, we fail to see how a grant in kind of goods furthering the religious enterprise can fare any better.
Id. at 250-51 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). Although the Court's message focused on the
establishment of religion, its language demonstrated skepticism toward the practice of offering public
aid to parochial schools through a third party intermediary. Not until Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), would the Court acknowledge that aid flowing to religiously affiliated schools is constitutional where the program is ideologically neutral and the recipients include students attending both public and private schools.
143. See generally Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251-52 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
367-373 (1975).
144. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S., 756 (1973)
(holding state low-income student scholarships and income tax credits for families sending children to
sectarian schools to be unconstitutional aid to religion) with Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
(upholding a tax deduction for transportation and tuition expenses of public and private school students, with the recognition that the deduction for tuition expenses affected only those families with
children attending private schools). In addition to the confusion attending any application of the tracing
theory, this approach potentially violates the ruling in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), that a state law that compelled students to attend only public schools was unconstitutional
because it impermissibly interfered with the liberty of parents to decide on matters affecting the upbringing and education of their children. Id. at 534-35.
145. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
146. In this respect, the Court in Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997), recently reaffirmed the general principles used to evaluate whether government aid violates the Establishment
Clause.
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utes under the Establishment Clause is analyzed using a three-part test: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.""' 47 In Lemon, Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania attempted to supplement the salaries of teachers in private
sectarian schools in order to bring the salaries of private school teachers in line with
those of public school teachers." Noting that the benefits offered under the two legislative plans were more than indirect or incidental, 49 the Court held that while the
intent of the legislation was not to advance religion, the effect entailed excessive government entanglement with religion."s° As Chief Justice Burger explained,
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably
be required to ensure that these [restrictions intended to avoid the use of public
monies for the advancement of religion] are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance
of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts
will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.'
In application, each prong of the test has accounted for the invalidation of some
form of state aid to religion. For example, the first prong of the test was applied by the
Court just two years after Lemon in a case that resulted from the Pennsylvania
Legislature's effort to reimburse parents for the tuition expense of sectarian
schools.'52 The State claimed that the statute did not violate Lemon because the parents were not restricted in the use of the money. The Court did not accept this argument, noting that the legislation was clearly distinguishable from legislation crafted for
the benefit of all parents, since the plan provided special aid to parents who had chosen to support religious schools.'53
147. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Lemon, which represented the Court's first attempt at a comprehensive constitutional test for reviewing government aid to religion,, remains a viable basis for school
finance decisions. The test, however, has received extensive criticism. See McConnell, supra note 89,
at 127-34. According to Professor McConnell,
It is the parochial school aid cases that most starkly illustrate the perverse effects of the
Lemon test. In these cases, the Court generally has prohibited government aid to schools
that teach religion. But in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a celebrated decision, the Court
held that parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private, including
religious, schools. The Court explained, "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which
all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."
Without aid to private schools, however, the only way that parents can escape state
"standardization" is by forfeiting their entitlement to a free education for their children-that is, by paying twice: once for everyone else's schools (through property taxes)
and once for their own.
Id. at 131-32. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
148. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602-03.
149. Id. at 616 ("The substantial religious character of these church-related schools gives rise to
entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid.").
150. Id. at 620 ("It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of
church schools and hence of churches.").
151. Id. at 619.
152. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (holding that the tuition reimbursement plan violated
the second prong of the Lemon test because the statute, which afforded benefits solely to those who
chose to receive religious schooling, increased access to religious schools and consequently had the
primary effect of advancing religion).
153. Id. at 832 ("The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic benefit.
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The second prong of the Lemon test was applied in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.' 4 In that case, a New York state law provided
funding for maintenance and repair of non-public schools serving low-income families,
tuition reimbursements to families with students attending such schools and certain
income tax benefits. According to the Court, each of these measures failed under the
second prong of the Lemon test because each had the primary effect of advancing
religion. For example, the Court held that the entire repair budget of the sectarian
schools could have been funded by the program, as opposed to only that portion attributable to nonsectarian, core education. 55 More significantly, the Court found the effect of the tuition reimbursements was to provide financial support for private sectarian
schools, resulting in the inevitable conclusion that the statute's primary effect was to
advance religion.'56
Finally, in _Meek v. Pittenger' the Court applied the "entanglement" prong to
prohibit both the lending of instructional materials and the funding of counseling,
testing and psychological services in sectarian schools. Excessive entanglement with
religion was anticipated if the state was to properly monitor whether its materials or
employees were being used to advance the religious mission of the schools."'
While these decisions establish limits on the permissible relationship between
government and religious organizations, they also suggest that a well-designed school
voucher program could survive the Lemon test. First, the requirement of a secular
purpose is consistent with the intent of most voucher programs, which seek to improve
educational achievement, lower educational costs and provide alternatives to students
whose designated public school is underperforming. Second, because tuition vouchers
are redeemable at any school-public, private, religious or for-profit-their primary
effect is to expand educational alternatives for all parents. Where benefits have been
provided directly to families rather than religious schools, even if the benefits are in
turn used for some aspect of religious education, the Court has found the effect of the
legislation to be permissible. 9 Michael Heise noted, "Just as would occur when wel-

Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to parents to send their
children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is
to preserve and support religion-oriented institutions.").
154. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
155. Id. at 774 ("No attempt [was] made to restrict payments to those expenditures related to the
upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes .. ").
156. Id. at 783-85 ("[W]hile the other purposes for that aid-to perpetuate a pluralistic educational
environment and to protect the fiscal integrity of overburdened public schools-are certainly unexceptionable, the effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired fimancial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.") (footnote omitted).
157. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
158. Id. at 370 ("[Excessive entanglement would be required for Pennsylvania to be 'certain,' as it
must be, that Act 194 personnel do not advance the religious mission of the church-related schools in
which they serve.").
159. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist noted that "under Minnesota's arrangement, public funds become available only as a result
of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children"); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968) (writing on behalf of the majority, Justice White stated that "[tihe law was
construed by the Court of Appeals of New York as 'merely making available secular textbooks at the
request of the individual student.'); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (writing the
majority opinion, Justice Black concluded that the state legislation at issue "does no more than to provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.") (emphasis added).
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fare recipients give public funds (a portion of their welfare benefits) to religious institutions, any aid to religious schools through a voucher program would be indirect,
would result from private choice, and would not depend on any financial incentive
favoring religious schools."' "w Finally, it is unlikely that excessive government entanglement with religion could result from the type of formalistic oversight which a
voucher system would entail. As the majority noted in Lemon,
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952). Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and
permissible contacts.... Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that
the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.""
Notwithstanding the Court's language in Lemon, it is important to note that the Court
could potentially invalidate a voucher proposal if it chose to categorize all the activities
of the religious schools receiving public funds. As with its recently overturned decision
in Aguilar v. Felton,62 the Court might choose to approve a voucher system only
where the aid was used for entirely secular purposes. 63 Under this theory, aid found
to support religious activities could be held to have the primary effect of advancing
religion. Furthermore, although extensive regulation might eliminate the potential for
public monies to be used for religious activities, such regulation would run the risk of
causing entanglement between church and state, thereby violating the third prong of
the Lemon test. It was precisely this catch-2264 which. the Court moved away from in
Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District.'
(2) Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
A recent decision by the Supreme Court indicates its willingness to permit the
use of public funds for religious instruction, as long as the funds are not distributed
directly to the school. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the State refused to provide an interpreter for a deaf student attending a Catholic school, despite
the availability of such interpreters in public and secular private schools. 65 The Court
disagreed with the State and held that the availability of an interpreter was a neutral
benefit provided without reference to religion." The Court reasoned that the govern-

160. Heise, supra note 88, at 142.
161. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
162. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that New York City's use of federal funds to
provide public school teachers to public and parochial schools for remedial education and clinical and
guidance services would result in excessive entanglement of church and state), rev'd, Agostini v.
Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
163. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Such a
program would necessarily result in the standardization of education expressly rejected in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
164. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 10. ("The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program that
distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled' under the [Individuals with Disabilities Education Act], without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the
school the child attends.").
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ment program providing an interpreter applied neutrally to any qualifying child and
that the child, not the sectarian school, primarily benefitted from the program. 67
Thus, as with the Court's decisions in Mueller v. Allen"s and Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,"6 the aid here was not considered to be accruing to the religious school. Moreover, the Court went beyond Mueller and Witters by
applying the child benefit theory without imposing upon it the constraints of the Lemon
test. The decision indicated a move away from the view that the Establishment Clause
prohibits any portion of public funds to be used for religious instruction. Further, the
holding suggested that the Court was taking a step away from the Lemon test and the
tracing theory, and moving toward a more accomodationist approach to Establishment
Clause questions.
The most significant aspect of the Zobrest decision may be found in footnote
eleven, in which the Court suggested that families acting as intermediaries in the application of public funds to religious purposes might avoid Establishment Clause problems altogether. As the Court explained, there would be no problem under the Establishment Clause if the funds instead went directly to the student's parents, who could
then hire the interpreter themselves. 7 ° The Court went on to quote from the
respondent's brief that the interpreter in such a situation would be the student's employee, not the school's, and "government involvement in the enterprise would [therefore] end with the disbursement of funds."'' The application of this line of reasoning
to a school choice plan is obvious: legislation mandating the disbursement of public
funds to parents in the form of government vouchers would make the chosen school
the parent's employee, not the government's. Not only does this approach withstand
First Amendment scrutiny, but it also comports with the concept of a free market for
education.
Zobrest, taken together with Mueller, Witters, Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist," and Sloan v. Lemon,' makes the indirect flow
of public aid to sectarian schools through a third party intermediary relatively unassailable, provided that the relevant aid program is ideologically neutral and the class of
recipients includes students attending both public and private schools. Given the
Court's long-standing rejection of the idea that aid flowing to religious institutions
automatically violates the Establishment Clause by freeing funds for religious purpos-

167. Id. at 13. ("The (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] creates a neutral government
program dispensing aid not to schools but to individual handicapped children.").
168. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
169. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
170. Id. at 13 n.11. Although Zobrest acknowledged the necessity for the ideological neutrality of
permissible aid programs, in footnote eleven the Court implied that a less exhaustive list of criteria are
necessary to overcome Establishment Clause scrutiny than previously thought. See generally Committee
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973) ("[T]he fact that aid is
disbursed to parents rather than to the schools is only one among many factors to be considered.")
(emphasis added).
171. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13 n.11 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 11, Zobrest (No. 92-94)). This
line of reasoning was previously addressed in Mueller and Witters. In Mueller, Justice Rehnquist noted
that channeling assistance to sectarian schools through parents "reduced the Establishment Clause objections." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399. Similarly, in Witters Justice Marshall wrote that state scholarship aid
which ultimately flowed to sectarian institutions did so "only as a result of the genuinely independent
and private choices of aid recipients." Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
172. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
173. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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es, 74 the Zobrest decision obfuscates the primary arguments against aid that is equally redeemable at public and private institutions. While some opponents of choice proposals have confused the relevant constitutional questions by maintaining that "eligibility for participa[tion] in a voucher program is always contingent upon attendance at
private schools,"'7 any legitimate voucher plan would avoid such patent invalidity
through the choice of voucher redemption at public, private or for-profit schools.
By relying upon the child benefit theory, to the exclusion of the Lemon test,
Zobrest suggested that the neutral application of benefits and the indirect flow of aid to
sectarian and non-sectarian schools represent the necessary base-line criteria for a
constitutionally sound voucher proposal.'76
(3) Agostini v. Felton
In the short period since Zobrest, its specific implications, as well as the general
direction of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, have been fervently debated.'"
Without acknowledging this debate, on June 23, 1997, the Court crafted the latest
chapter in its developing application of the Establishment Clause to aid for education
programs. Twelve years after its decisions in Aguilar v. Felton,' and its companion
case, School District v. Ball,' 9 the Court revisited both decisions in Agostini v.
Felton"8 by use of an otherwise obscure rule of procedure,' s' concluding that
82
Zobrest amounted to "fresh law"'
and contributed to a significant change in Estab8 3
lishment Clause jurisprudence.
In Agostini petitioners sought review of the Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar,
alleging that subsequent changes in both the factual conditions underlying the decision
and the decisional law of the Court rendered the ruling prospectively inequitable, and
thereby reviewable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).' 4 In Aguilar, the

174. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (rejecting "the recurrent argument that all aid
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources on religious ends"); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981) ("If the
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, 'a church could not
be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair."') (citations
omitted).
175. Green, supra note 83, at 66-67.
176. Julie Marie Hood, What's Past Is Prologue: Establishment Clause JurisprudenceAfter Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills School District, 1994 WIs. L. REv. 1327 (1994) (discussing the application of the
child-benefit theory in Zobrest and the implications of a move away from the Lemon test).
177. Green, supra note 83; Peyser, supra note 19; Heise, supra note 88; Daniel, supra note 102;
Hood, supra note 176.
178. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
179. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
180. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
181. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The question presented in Agostini v. Felton was whether the petitioners-parents of private school children bound by Aguilar v. Felton's injunction against New York
City's use of public employees to administer remedial education-were entitled to relief from the injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006. Rule 60(b)(5)
reads in pertinent part, "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment [or] order . . . [when] it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application." Id.
182. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011 ("Indeed, even the Zobrest dissenters acknowledged the shift
Zobrest effected in our Establishment Clause law when they criticized the majority for 'stray[ing] . . .
from the course set by nearly five decades of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.' Thus, it was
Zobrest-and not this case [Agostini]-that created 'fresh law."' (emphasis added)).
183. Id. at 2006 (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)).
184. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006.
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Court held that the Establishment Clause barred New York City from sending public
school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education for disadvantaged
children under a congressionally mandated program. 5 The Court reasoned that the
program necessitated an excessive entanglement of church and state"8 6 in violation of
the Establishment Clause." 7 Accordingly, the city was enjoined from allowing secular instruction by public school teachers on the premises of parochial schools."
In seeking review of Aguilar, petitioners cited one factual and two legal developments warranting relief from the injunction. 9 While dismissing two of petitioner's
claimed developments, the Court agreed with the third: that Aguilar had been so undermined by the subsequent Establishment Clause decisions in Witters and Zobrest that it
was no longer good law."9
The Agostini Court's review of Aguilar and its companion, Ball, noted three
mutual assumptions as well as afu.th precept u"-,que to Aguilar which had been
directly or implicitly rebutted in subsequent decisions of the Court.' Explaining that
it had abandoned the presumption of Meek and Ball that the presence of public employees on parochial school grounds invariably results in state-sponsored religious
indoctrination and/or a "symbolic union" between government and religion, the

185. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (1994 & Supp. 1995)). The statute states in part,
Educational needs are particularly great for low-achieving children in our Nation's highest-poverty schools, children with limited English proficiency, children of migrant workers, children, with disabilities, Indian children, children who are neglected or delinquent,
and young children and their parents who are in need of family literacy services.
20 U.S.C. §6301(b)(3).
186. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409 ("Mhe supervisory system established by the City of New York
inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and state, an Establishment Clause concern
distinct from that addressed by the effects doctrine.").
187. Id. at 412-13.
188. Id. at 413.
189. Agostini, 117 -S.Ct. at 2006. According to the petitioners, the primary developments warranting modification of the injunction were (1) the exorbitant cost of complying with the injunction while
concurrently meeting the requirements of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act; (2) the fact
that a majority of justices deciding Board of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), had expressed
the view that Aguilar should be reconsidered or overruled; and (3) the fact that Aguilar had been
undermined by subsequent Establishment Clause decisions in Witters, Zobrest and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. at 819 (1995).
190. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010-16.
191. The premises underlying the Establishment Clause violations found in Ball and Aguilar are
described in Agostini as the "assumption" that,
(i) [A]ny public employee who works on the premises of a religious school is presumed
to inculcate religion in her work; (ii) the presence of public employees on private school
premises creates a symbolic union between church and state; and (iii) any and all public
aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances
religious indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private
decision-making. Additionally, in Aguilar there was a fourth assumption: that New York
City's Title I program necessitated an excessive government entanglement with religion
because public employees who teach on the premises of religious schools must be closely monitored to ensure that they do not inculcate religion.
Id. at 2010. In her opinion on behalf of the majority, Justice O'Connor addressed each of the assumptions individually, explaining that the Court's understanding of the criteria used to evaluate whether a
program has an "impermissible effect" had changed. Id.
192. Id. at 2010-11. Moreover, in Justice O'Connor's review of the Ball decision, she describes as
notable the fact that the Supreme Court disregarded the lack of any specific evidence of religious
indoctrination when reviewing the constitutionality of the program. Throughout the majority's opinion,
Justice O'Connor develops the thesis that the mere "possibility" of religious indoctrination resulting
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majority noted that it was Zobrest which had "expressly disavow[ed]" these ideas. Further, by reference to Witters and Zobrest the Court expressed its abandonment of the
assumption in Ball that all government aid directly benefitting the educational function
of religious schools is invalid.'93 This latter point is of particular significance to proponents of school choice. In Agostini the Court acknowledged that the Establishment
Clause did not interfere in the issuance of a vocational tuition grant to a blind student
attending a Christian college, 94 or a deaf student using a publicly employed interpreter in a religious school. 95 The rationale in both cases, identified and endorsed by
the majority in Agostini, maintained that public funds went to the religious institutions
"only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals."'"
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the aid at issue in Agostini was indistinguishable
from the aid offered in Zobrest.' 9
Finally, the majority signaled its intention to rein in the use of the entanglement
prong of Lemon. While reaffirming that entanglement remains part of the Court's
Establishment Clause analysis, the Court reasoned that entanglement was merely an
"aspect of the inquiry into the statute's effect," i.e., Lemon's second prong. 98 Noting
that entanglement does not necessarily have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the Court retreated from the concept that all possible forms of entanglement violated the Establishment Clause.'" Here, the majority embraced a more
accomodationist approach, confirming that it will no longer invalidate government
programs on the mere possibility that they might advance religion. Moreover, the
Court acknowledged the ripple effect of a much stricter view of entanglement; that is,
to the extent the Court no longer presumes that public employees will inculcate religion simply by virtue of being placed in a sectarian environment, the administering
government body is free to allow state-funded non-religious instruction without need
for the kind of pervasive monitoring which would create excessive entanglement."e
In both express and implicit terms, Agostini reflects the Court's elevation of
Lemon's second prong-asking whether the aid has the principle or primary effect of
advancing religion-to a position as the preeminent inquiry in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.2"' Consequently, the significance of Agostini has to do not only with

from public assistance to parochial schools is, of itself, insufficient to warrant a finding that the program violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2024.
193. Id. Referring to Witters, the Court noted,
The grants were disbursed directly to students, who then used the money to pay for
tuition at the educational institution of their choice. In our view, this transaction was no
different from a State's issuing a paycheck to one of its employees, knowing that the
employee would donate part or all of the check to a religious institution.
Id. at 2011.
194. Witters, 474 U.S. at 481.
195. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1.
196. Agostini, 117 S.Ct. at 2012 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83 n.38 (1973)).
197. Id. at 2012.
198. Id. at 2015.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2010. Significantly, the Agostini Court never mentions the Lemon test, opting instead to
note those aspects of Establishment Clause analysis which continue to influence the Court.
To be sure, the general principles we use to evaluate whether government aid violates
the Establishment Clause have not changed since Aguilar was decided. For example, we
continue to ask whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibit-
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its clarification of the status of cases such as Zobrest, Witters, Aguilar, Ball and Meek,
but with its much broader conclusion that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has significantly changed since it decided Aguilar.2"° Although the Court was
unwilling to express its abandonment of the Lemon test, both its reliance on Zobrest
and its acknowledgment of a changing perception of the criteria used to determine
whether aid has the effect of advancing religion promise to focus the attention of Establishment Clause jurisprudence away from symbolic or potential advancement of religion toward empirically demonstrable violations. 3 In this manner, Agostini reflects
the Court's move away from the separationist standards of the Lemon test toward an
analysis that accommodates the private choices of aid recipients.
Following Agostini, the most significant apparent hurdle for choice proponents
under Establishment Clause jurisprudence may be the idea that public aid to parochial
schools is appropriate only to the extent that it does not relieve the sectarian school of
costs it otherwise would have borne.2'° Although Agostini and Zobrest found refuge
from these arguments by virtue of the fact that the subject programs were merely
"supplemental" to the regular curricula,0" it is noteworthy that in Winers a student's
individual decision to use a state-funded scholarship for religious education did not
mandate the conclusion that the programs principle or primary effect was to advance
religion.' Given Agostini's elevation of the Court's "effects" analysis, it would now
appear that the decision to offer state aid to all students under an ideologically neutral
program allowing the student to select the school of their choice among private and
public providers will withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.

ing religion, and the nature of that inquiry has remained largely unchanged. Likewise,
we continue to explore whether the aid has the "effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. What has changed since we decided Ball and Aguilar is our understanding of the
criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect.
Id. (citations omitted). Later in its opinion, the Court again signaled that programs containing a neutral
purpose will be evaluated primarily with an eye toward determining whether they have the "effect" of
advancing religion. Id. at 2015-16. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court did not abandon the entanglement prong of Lemon so much as it collapsed this prong into the criteria used to determine a government program's "effect." Noting that entanglement should be treated "as an aspect of the inquiry
into a statute's effect," the Court explained,
[The] three primary criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the
effect of advancing religion [are]: it does not result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement.
Id. at 2016.
202. Id. at 2017.
203. In this respect the majority looked to Zobrest as evidence of its "refus[al] to presume that a
[public employee] would be pressured by the pervasively sectarian surroundings to inculcate religion"
by adding to or subtracting from the course work. Id. at 2010-11. The Court also identified, as a
weakness of the Ball holding, the lack of any evidence of actual religious indoctrination. Id. at 200809. Moreover, with respect to Aguilar, the Court stated, "Certainly, no evidence has ever shown that
any New York City Title I instructor teaching on parochial school premises attempted to inculcate religion in students." Id. at 2012 (citations omitted).
204. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12. This idea dates back to Meek, 421 U.S. at 350 and Wolman,
433 U.S. at 248-51, both of which suggested that public funds distributed to religious schools aided
religion by increasing the recipient school's budgets.
205. Agostini, 117 S. Ct at 2013-14.
206. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
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b. State Action Doctrine
Although First Amendment challenges regarding educational vouchers apply only
to religious schools, the Fourteenth Amendment's state action doctrine poses a potential threat to the efficient and autonomous operation of both private and for-profit
institutions. For example, private schools acting under the color of state law must
adhere to due process requirements' ° and observe student privacy rights,2'a among

other constitutional requirements.' °9
Although private schools are currently regulated by state and federal law, the
application of statutes such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964210 or section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, " both of which apply to recipients of federal
funds, could potentially bankrupt participating private and for-profit schools. For example, Title VI would impose a duty on private schools receiving funds to provide English language instruction to non-English-speaking students."' Also, if subject to section 504, private schools would be required to provide educational services to handicapped students which are not otherwise mandated."'
Ultimately, the question may be reduced to whether contracts With public agencies render private institutions state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is
significant that in Witters, the Court noted that the student's individual choice to use
his scholarship at a religious institution demonstrated that the payment to the school
did not amount to state action." 4 Moreover, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn," 5 the Supreme Court did not find state action where a private school, funded largely by the

207. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 568 (1975) (regarding the due process which must be
afforded students before imposing suspension).
208. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-43 (1985) (observing the right of public
school students against unreasonable searches by school administrators).
209. See generally PuBLic DOLLARS FOR PRIVATE SCHooLS 166-70 (Thomas James & Henry M.
Levin eds., 1983) (discussing the myriad constitutional protections provided to public school students
but not required of private institutions with private funding).
210. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601-605, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d - 2000d-4a (1994).
211. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
212. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 567 (1974) (Relying solely on the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Court beld, "Basic English skills are at the very core of what [the] public schools teach.
Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can effectively participate in the educational program,
he must already have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public education.").
213. Although section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "by its terms does not compel educational institutions to . . . make substantial modifications in their programs to allow disabled persons to
participate," nor does the failure to do so constitute discrimination, Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). it has nonetheless been held that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (Education of the Handicapped Act), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o (1994), which relies
upon the Rehabilitation Act for enforcement by way of federal funding, mandates that the state provide
"personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the [handicapped] child to benefit
educationally from that instruction . . . [so as] to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to
grade," Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982). In Board of Education v. Rowley,
the Court reversed the Second Circuit's order that a Westchester County school district provide a sign
language interpreter for an eight-year-old deaf child pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, but noted, however, that the Act's mandate of a "free appropriate public education" required
"instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child." Rowley, 458 U.S.
at 188-89. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that under the Act, educational services were to be
provided "at public expense and under public supervision ...
." Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
214. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 ("On the facts we have set out, it does not seem appropriate to
view any aid ultimately flowing to the Inland Empire School of the Bible as resulting from a state
action sponsoring or subsidizing religion.").
215. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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state, dismissed teachers without the level of due process afforded to public school
teachers." 6 The Court's decision, however, focused on the fact that the school's conon the education of the school's students, and not on personnel mattract centered
7
ters.

21

Weighing in favor of the autonomy of private and for-profit schools is the fact
that such institutions rely heavily on non-governmental standards, which give the
schools the appearance of anything but state actors. Furthermore, unlike the bureaucracies that govern public schools, private and for-profit institutions construct fewer barriers between schools and their consumers. Thus, it is less likely in a free market that
education consumers will have to petition their legislators to get the special needs of
their children met. At the same time, however, without standardized government mandates, private and for-profit schools will not be required to accommodate special needs
that do not exist in their student body, as public schools are by federal and state statutes.
2. State ConstitutionalRestraints
Several characteristics of state constitutions indicate that they may pose the most
serious threat to the successful implementation of school choice. Because all powers
not conferred upon the federal government are reserved to the states, the various state
constitutions give structure to the extremely broad powers of the states."' Not surprisingly, these broad charters often protect individual rights which are not secured under the Federal Constitution, such as the right to an education. 1 9
The authority of the states on matters not subject to the federal charter is further
expanded by the nonuniformity of state constitutional jurisprudence.22 Although most
state constitutions contain similar provisions, many of which were originally borrowed
from the charters of other states, 22' there is no necessity for uniform interpretation.
The method by which state constitutional jurisprudence develops is limited only by the

216. Id. at 841-42 ("The most intrusive personnel regulation promulgated by the various government agencies was the requirement that the Committee on Criminal Justice had the power to approve
persons hired as vocational counselors. Such a regulation is not sufficient to make a decision to discharge, made by private management, state action.").
217. Id. at 838-39 n.6.
218. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 785 (Md. 1983) ("[S]tate
constitutions, unlike the federal constitution, are not of limited or delegated powers and not restricted
to provisions of fundamental import; consequently, whether a right is fundamental should not be predicated on its explicit or implicit inclusion in a state constitution.").
219. See Charles G. Douglas m, State Judicial Activism--The New Role for State Bills of Rights,
12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1144-45 (1978).
220. See A.E. Dick Howard, Introduction: A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, in
DEvELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xxi (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) ("[S]tate courts
act properly when they develop an independent body of constitutional law ....").Professor Howard
notes, however, that state constitutional jurisprudence should consistently reflect the core values shared
among states in the development of their independent charters. "[The] notion of a 'common market' of
constitutional rights has strong moral overtones. Any principled theory of state constitutional litigation
that invites standards that may vary . . . from state to state certainly should take account of this issue." Id. at xviii. The problem of course with the idea of state courts referring to foreign interpretations of similar constitutional provisions, is that it assumes similarly worded provisions embody similar
intentions. Justice Charles Douglas of New Hampshire comments on the undue deference to interpretations of the Federal Constitution by noting, "The federalization of all our rights has led to a rapid
withering of the development of state decisions based upon state constitutional provisions." Douglas,
supra note 219, at 1140.
221. Howard, supra note 220, at xiii.
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perceived obligation of state courts to justify departures from federal precedents.222
Where rights protected by the states are not created or addressed by the Federal Constitution, this process is simple; the state merely cites the obligation created by the

state charter. This is the case, for example, with state constitutional education guarantees.
a. State ConstitutionalEducation Guarantees
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,223 the United States Supreme
Court concluded that education is not a fundamental right protected under the Federal
Constitution.224 Noting that the Constitution does not expressly or implicitly mention
the right to education, the Court left to the states the responsibility of guaranteeing
education rights. 2" Because all state constitutions place an obligation upon the legislature to provide free schools to their citizens, state courts have assumed responsibility
for interpreting the constitutional right to education.226 Toward this end, the vast majority of state courts have recognized that their state charters refer to the creation of
"public" or "common" schools.227 These references suggest that it would require judicial interpretation of state constitutions to determine what free market arrangements
would fulfill the requirement of public education.
Since the Court's decision in Rodriguez, a number of state courts have reviewed
whether the education articles of their state constitution offer a guarantee of equal or
minimally adequate public or common schooling. 8 These cases generally fall into
two categories: school financing suits relying on due process and equal protection
arguments, where state constitutional education guarantees are a preliminary matter,
and education rights claims, where the central issue is the minimum level of educational opportunity required under the state charter.229 To the extent that most state consti-

222. See generally Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165, 176 (1984). Although state courts frequently avoid conflicts with federal precedents, Linde
notes that concerns over departures from federal jurisprudence are irrational in light of the independent
basis for state constitutional decisions and the broad powers of the state charter.
Why [do] state courts [not] always apply state law before reaching a federal question? In
fact they routinely do so with state statutes or constitutional provisions that have no
federal parallel. But when the Supreme Court has decided a point, many state courts
take the decision as a kind of benchmark, presumptively correct also for state law. When
they depart from federal decisions, state courts often begin by explaining that the Supreme Court permits them to interpret their state's law in their own way-a sign of how
far we have lost sight of basic federalism.
Id.
223. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
224. Id. at 35 ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have
said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation.").
225. Id. at 44 ("lIlt would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing
public education presently in existence in virtually every state.").
226. See Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self Government: The Right to Education Under State
Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 94 (1989) (citing the creation of a theory of educational
rights being developed by the states).
227. Id. at 97.
228. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (NJ.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585
P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
229. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65
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tutions vest the legislature with exclusive responsibility for the establishment of public
education,230 state court decisions regarding education guarantees generally offer little
more than baseline criteria for complying with the constitutional command of public or
common schooling.23 Thus, although the state courts have in some cases defined the
meaning of the education guarantee, they have generally deferred to the state
legislature's plan for conferring education." In doing so, state courts have ultimately
mandated the establishment of financing equalization schemes and minimum educational standards,233 but have given broad deference to the resulting legislative programs.234 Ultimately, in light of the constraints placed on judicial activism by the language of most state constitutional education guarantees, it is unlikely that these provisions will invalidate the use of public funds for private and for-profit education.
b. Implicit Limitations on State Conferrals of Power
Although state constitutions by their terms do not prohibit government grants of
authority to private parties, several constitutional clauses require state control of public
functions.235 For example, public purpose clauses either limit the use of public funds
for non-public purposes or specify that no funds will be distributed to non-public uses.' In cases dealing with the public purpose doctrine, courts place emphasis on
whether the benefit is realized primarily by the public or by a private institution. Some
state courts have consequently allowed the conferral of public benefits directly upon
private institutions serving members of the public,237 while others have rejected
them."5 Thus, although a school choice plan which calls for the distribution of funds
directly to private and for-profit schools might be rejected under the public purpose

TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (1992) (discussing recent state court interpretations of constitutional education guarantees).
230. Id. at 1329.
231. The reason for such limited judicial influence owes both to the standard of review applied by
the state courts and the language of the specific education guarantees. Where state courts have determined that education does not constitute a fundamental right or involve a suspect class, the courts
have applied the rational basis test, asking whether the state's method of financing and/or delivering
education is rationally related to the legitimate objective of a "fair" or "efficient" education, terms
frequently found in the state education guarantee. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005 (Colo. 1982). Additionally, because most state constitutions provide the legislature with sole responsibility for maintaining a system of education, state courts are restrained in their efforts to effectuate constitutional education rights. See generally Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (NJ.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood hidep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle
Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
232. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle
Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979).
233. See GARMS Er AL., supra note 8.
234. See generally Note, supra note 10, at 1082-85 (noting state court reluctance to interfere with

inadequate legislation because of concerns relating to separation of powers, taxing power and local
political pressures).
235. See generally David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647,
658-68 (1986) (surveying general characteristics of state constitutions and noting provisions limiting the
delegation of government authority to private actors).
236. See generally 15 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 39.19-39.26
(3d ed. rev. 1985 & Supp. 1991) (reviewing constitutional barriers established by the public purpose
doctrine).
237. See, e.g., Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 771 P.2d 608 (Okla. 1989) (allowing a municipality to
purchase land from a private college and then lease it back at a bargain rate).
238. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Alton Water Co., 145 N.E. 683 (Ill. 1924) (prohibiting a municipality from paying for a private school's water service).
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doctrine, distribution of publicly funded vouchers directly to parents would not.
In addition to the public purpose doctrine, judicial constructions have been used
by state courts to limit the power of private actors in the public arena. One such construction is the non-delegation doctrine." 9 This doctrine potentially interferes with
delegations of state authority to private parties."l It does so, in many cases, by reference to state constitutional vesting clauses, which confer specific authority upon certain
branches of government. Because these clauses are frequently interpreted as limits on
which branches of government may exercise specific powers, the delegation of governmental authority to private actors could be prohibited by the doctrine. Moreover,
some state constitutions contain provisions that specifically vest government agents
with control over public schools.24 These clauses provide direct authority for the invalidation of delegations of government power.
The concern addressed by such clauses and by the non-delegation doctrine is that
government authority will be used by private parties to further their own interests at
the expense of the public interest.242 Although the courts have frequently been inclined to enforce private delegations of authority when the interests of the private actor
are closely aligned with those of the conferring agency and/or the public, 243 state
courts have created no precise guidelines for this determination. In general, factors
such as the availability of agency and judicial review and the creation of guidelines to
govern private actors have persuaded state courts to uphold private delegations. 2"
With respect to the privatization of education, it is unclear whether state courts will
find extensive educational regulations adequate to limit the pursuit of purely private
benefits.2 4 Moreover, because educational instruction is far more discretionary in na-

239. See Lawrence, supra note 235, at 650.
240. Id.
241. Hubsch, supra note 226, at 134-40 (reviewing each state's constitutional provision for the
operation of public education and the specific language regarding the role of the government).
242. Lawrence, supra note 235, at 659-61. Professor Lawrence notes that this concern has public
policy as well as strict constitutional dimensions.
When a public official is permitted to exercise a public power, he is generally expected
to do so in a basically disinterested way. The community expects him to act from some
conception of what is good for the community or according to standards that seek to
further community interests, as opposed to acting to further his narrow private interests . . . . [Among other concerns, the prospect] that private interest will affect the content of actions has obvious due process connections. One settled element of procedural
due process is that the decision-maker must not be personally biased, that he must make
his decision according to established standards or a disinterested view of the public interest. If a delegation creates the opportunity for private interest to dominate the use of
governmental power, then those against whom the power is used may well have suffered
deprivations without due process.
Id. In the context of the elementary and secondary education market, delegation of the right to receive
federal and state funding could arguably empower the private service provider to ignore the needs of
the intended beneficiary, the student. Although the theoretical structure of choice legislation would
allow short-term redress of this situation by resort to the selection of an alternative school, the regulatory overview of the state would be necessary to avoid entry into the market by service providers
seeking purely short-term profits.
243. Id. at 686-88.
244. See George W. Leibmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50
IND. LJ. 650, 697-701 (1975) (noting that many courts refuse to uphold delegations of government
authority to private actors without provisions for agency and/or judicial review); see also Lawrence,
supra note 235, at 692 (noting that the creation of guidelines that direct private actors increases the
likelihood that delegations will be upheld).
245. This, of course, assumes that the benefit derived by the education provider in the form of
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ture than government activities currently delegated to private service providers, it is
unlikely that state courts will analogize ministerial activities such as private garbage
collection services with more complex activities such as school instruction.
Because the landscape of current case law interpreting the non-delegation doctrine offers little indication as to how state courts may view the delegation of responsibility for public education,2" and because the vesting clauses themselves fail to provide any textual guidance, school choice proposals are vulnerable to arbitrary judicial
invalidation based upon state vesting clauses and the non-delegation principle they are
interpreted to support. Given that no market-based or private choice proposal has yet to
be enacted, however, state courts that would employ the non-delegation doctrine to
invalidate such legislation must do so without actual evidence of a conflict between
public and private interests. Because few courts have adopted a rule prohibiting all
private delegations, the practical necessity for evidence of improper effect should limit
the use of the non-delegation doctrine against school choice plans.
B. Why Should School Choice Prevail?
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District,2" the major challenge facing proponents of educational
choice shifted to the various state constitutions and certain limitations they embody.
Among these, the public purpose and non-delegation doctrines pose the greatest threat
to the privatization of education. Both doctrines address the fundamental problem
posed by privatization: self-interested decision-makers could wrest control of public
functions from government, only to degrade the quality of service by pursuit of private
incentives such as profit. In contrast to these concerns, the benefits accruing from a
market system, such as cost efficiency and competition over quantifiable performance
standards, indicate the conformity of public and private interests. For example, cost
efficiency, a major goal of every school in a market system, is consistent with the
public and governmental interest in the efficient allocation of government resources.
Although excessive cost-cutting motivated by profit rather than student enrichment may
occur, this excess is controlled by the education consumer, who may choose to take
their education dollar elsewhere if quality declines. Moreover, if the interests of the
education consumer were to shift away from the quality of education itself toward an
interest inconsistent with the state constitutional guarantee of a "thorough" or "efficient"'24 system of education, an earlier judicial validation of the delegation may be
reviewed. As such, a free market for educational services would exist subject to state
constitutional guarantees regarding the quality of instruction and curriculum.249 Given
voucher redemptions is somehow separate from any benefit accruing to the public. Courts reviewing
private delegations have rejected similar arguments, which ignore the relative advantage of some private
service providers and the benefit to the public of more efficient service. See generally In re Hansen,
275 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn. 1978) (noting the state's inability to efficiently evaluate the quality of
American law schools, and the wisdom of delegating this responsibility to the American Bar Association).
246. Lawrence, supra note 235, at 668 ("mhe ultimate criticism of the vesting clause as a constitutional basis is that it has failed to inspire a body of principled case law.").
247. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
248. Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 815 (noting that every state except Alabama and Mississippi have
constitutional provisions requiring a system of free public schools, most of which are required under
the state charter to be "thorough" or "efficient").
249. Lawrence, supra note 235, at 687; see also Keller, supra note 19 (examining the serious
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these continuing constitutional safeguards, it is difficult to justify the invalidation of
school choice on state constitutional grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is important to recognize that the current school system was designed over 150
years ago and supported this nation's extraordinarily successful industrial era very
well. The problem is not the concept of mass public education, but the fact that in
its current form mass public education no longer adequately prepares young people
for a real world, one that has changed dramatically. What we teach, how we teach
it, and what we expect from students must change if we are to succeed in the
twenty-first century.z

The next frontier in public school finance reform should shift the focus of reform
efforts from the redistribution of taxpayer wealth to the competitiveness of our public
schools. After a quarter-century of finance reform litigation, the nation is awakening to
the fact that public education is failing not only our urban and rural poor, but students
from our wealthiest districts as well. Moreover, public education is also failing our
brightest students in every socioeconomic class.
Given this backdrop, there is a great deal of disagreement over why and how our
system has fallen into disrepair. The causes of declining student performance, for example, have been variously attributed. Educators have long cited a lack of proper educational funding; nonetheless, with a dramatic infusion of capital over the past thirty
years and with one of the highest per pupil spending averages of any industrialized nation, this defense has finally lost steam. Recently, economists, legislators and education
experts alike have begun to reexamine the structural impediments posed by the
government's monopoly over education. This examination has resulted in a call for
market-based reform of national education.
The call for a free market in education faces political and legal challenges. As-

public policy tensions involved in the process of seeking to use public funds to underwrite the costs
of public and traditionally non-public educational institutions). The tensions identified by Professor
Keller call for certain trade-offs, including some measure of increased regulatory control over private
and for-profit schools and the acceptance of competition by the current public education monopoly.
Whether the burdens of public policy and constitutional jurisprudence which limit the right of public
school districts to organize restrictive admissions actually outweigh the benefits of specialized curricula
such as the Afrocentric all-male academies advocated by the Detroit school district, there are, nonetheless, no persuasive legal prohibitions against school choice proposals which give universal access to the
broadest possible choice of schools.
250. GERSTNER, supra note 2, at xiii; see also FRiDMAN, supra note 58, at 96-97. Milton Friedman has stated,
I am by no means sure that [school choice] would in fact have been desirable a century
ago.... [Tlhe major problem in the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century was not to promote diversity but to create the core of common values essential
to a stable society. Great streams of immigrants were flooding the United States from all
over the world, speaking different languages and observing diverse customs. The "melting
pot" had to introduce some measure of conformity and loyalty to common values. The
public school had an important function in this task, not least by imposing English as a
common language. Under the alternative voucher scheme, the minimum standards imposed on schools to qualify for approval could have included the use of English. But it
might well have been more difficult to insure that this requirement was imposed and
satisfied in a private school system. I do not mean to conclude that the public school
system was definitely preferable to the alternative, but only that a far stronger case could
have been made for it then than now.
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suming that the nation's psychological investment in government-operated public education can be overcome, and assuming a true free market could be implemented, federal and state constitutional challenges pose the final threat for derailing choice initiatives. Following the Supreme Court's recent adoption of the child benefit theory in
Establishment Clause cases, the likelihood that federal constitutional claims will invalidate school choice has greatly diminished. Further, although several state constitutional
provisions limit the exercise of government authority by private parties, as long as the
benefit of government funding is realized primarily by the public consumer rather than
the private service provider, such provisions should not interfere with school choice
legislation.
Today, carefully designed choice proposals are both feasible and worthy of serious review. Only time will tell whether the public's growing impatience with the current educational system can instigate the shift to a free market.

